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THE MATURING OF THE WORLD REVOLUTIONARY CRISIS AND THE RELATION BETWEEN THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STRUGGLES OF THE PROLETARIAT

THE Twelfth Plenum of the E.C.C.I., on the basis of its estimate of the international situation ("capitalist stabilisation has come to an end and the transition is taking place to a new round of revolutions and wars") formulated the principal tactical task of the Communist Parties as follows: ". . . The whole international situation raises acutely the question of carrying out the *principal* task of the Communist Parties at the present time: *to prepare the working class and the exploited masses, in the course of the economic and political struggle, for the coming battles for power, for the dictatorship of the proletariat.**

The events which have followed the Plenum have wholly confirmed the correctness of all its decisions.

A year has passed since the Twelfth Plenum. The world historic victories of Socialism in the U.S.S.R., the further intensification of the economic crisis in the capitalist world, the further growth of the revolutionary upsurge, are the main causes of the fact that the general crisis of capitalism *has come right up to a new stage in its development,* that the capitalist world *has come face to face* with a new round of revolutions and wars, that a world revolutionary crisis is maturing, putting on the order of the day the question of power, the question of struggle for a Soviet government, for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The peculiar feature of the present moment is that the rapid tempo of fascisation in all the capitalist countries, the establishment of open Fascist dictatorship in Germany, and the growing Fascist terror, particularly in Poland and the Balkans, are not the product of victorious counter-revolution in the alleged "epoch of reaction" which has set in, as we are assured by the Social-Fascists, the counter-revolutionary Trotskyists, and their agents within our ranks, the opportunists of all colours, but a preventative means of defence against the maturing proletarian revolution and the direct answer of the bourgeoisie to the maturing revolutionary crisis in the capitalist world. The present situation affords vivid confirmation of Marx's words—that in its advance the revolution unites the ranks of the counter-revolution, that is, it compels the enemy to adopt ever sharper weapons of defence and attack and at the same time creates ever more powerful means for the advance of the revolution.

The ruinous course of the four years of economic crisis, the bankruptcy of bourgeois programmes of "economic recovery," the Fascist terror and the immediate danger of a new war lead to an enormous growth of discontent and revolutionary indignation among the widest masses against the disasters into which the bourgeoisie has brought them, and to the maturing of a world revolutionary crisis. There is no capitalist country in which the great world historic victories of the building of Socialism in the U.S.S.R., against the background of the ever intensifying economic and general crisis of capitalism, do not face the toiling masses with the *question of power,* the question of the two different roads: the road of the Soviets, of the victorious proletarian revolution under the leadership of the Communist Party, the only road which will lead to the liberation of the toilers from all exploitation and oppression, and the second road—the road which leads, and in a number of countries has already led, to Fascist dictatorship, the road cleared and smoothed by Social-Fascism, which leads to the enslavement and the bloody crushing of the toilers, to new imperialist wars and slaughter of new millions as an offering to bloodthirsty imperialism. The toiling masses are learning from their own bitter experience, explained by the Communist Parties. In fierce and bloody battles under the leadership of the Communist Parties they are freeing themselves from the illusions and superstitions, and in the first place of the "democratic" illusions, on which the Social-Democracy has fed them for decades. Ever more considerable sections of the toilers, crushed and muffled up to now by exploitation and oppression, fooled by the Social-Fascists, the trade union bosses, the parsons and the mercenary bourgeois press, deceived by the criminal Fascist demagogy, whose voices were covered by the nationalist trumpetings, are opening their eyes to reality.

Ever shorter becomes the remaining time of the maturing of the revolutionary crisis. But the

* Italics ours—Ed.

world revolutionary crisis is maturing and will mature *unevenly*. This -uneveness is caused partly by objective difficulties. It is opportunism, covered up by a "Left" phrase to deny that fascisation can temporarily, in same places, retard the course of the struggle, to deny the objective difficulties in the way of revolutionary development caused by the intensification of the Fascist terror of the bourgeoisie. But the Fascist raging of the bourgeoisie not only retards the maturing of the revolutionary crisis, but, which is much more important, it also *accelerates* it. This is what the Right opportunists, the agents of Social-Fascism in our ranks, do not see, what they deny and fight against. The pressure of the whole Fascist terror machine of the German bourgeoisie, which is one of the best organised in the world, and unprecedented in the history of the present-day working class movement, not only did not succeed in smashing or breaking the revolutionary German proletariat, but has led to so colossally-increased a hatred on the part of the proletariat, to such an enormous accumulation of revolutionary energy, that revolutionary demonstrations and strikes have begun and are growing in Germany at the present moment. These demonstrations and strikes in the conditions of Hitler terror are already of greater revolutionary importance than actions embracing many thousands in the conditions of so-called democracy. *A new revolutionary upsurge has already begun and is growing in Germany,* which places before the C.P.G. the task of preparing the conditions for armed overthrow of the Fascist dictatorship and establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In spite of the great intensification of the Fascist terror in Poland, mass strikes of the workers are now accompanied by revolutionary uprisings in the countryside of Poland, which confronts the C.P.P. with the task of uniting and centralising the struggle of the workers, peasants and the oppressed peoples for the revolutionary overthrow of the Fascist dictatorship and the establishment of a *government of the soviets* of workers', peasants' and soldiers' deputies. In the countries of Central Europe undergoing a rapid process of fascisation, as, for instance, Czecho-Slovakia, where the Social-Fascists themselves, in coalition with the parties of the "burghers" are establishing open Fascist dictatorship, the Communist Parties must, on the basis of the mass struggle for partial economic and political demands which they lead, raise before the masses the question of the seizure of power by the working class.

The new wave of the strike movement and the growth of the agrarian revolution in Spain confront the C.P.S. with the task of heading, at this new stage of the Spanish revolution, all forms of the movement of the employed and unemployed workers and the peasants, of mobilising the masses to smash the power of the landlords and the bourgeoisie and growing Fascism, leading the masses up to the stuggle for *the power of the Soviets.*

The heroic Communist Party of Japan is now faced with the task of preparing to convert imperialist war into civil war.

The existence of a *Soviet government* on one-sixth of the gigantic territory of China, its great successes in the struggle against the Kuomintang oppressors, who are supported by all the imperialist vultures, have an enormous revolutionising significance for the whole of China, and for all the colonial and semi-colonial countries of the East. *Soviet China* presents conclusive confirmation of the truth of the statement that *only the Soviets* can save the colonial and semi-colonial peoples from imperialist oppression and colonial slavery and pauperisation.

The question of whether the proletariat will be able to convert the growing world revolutionary crisis into a victorious proletarian revolution depends, above all, on whether the C.P.s are able to win the leadership of the working class by a correct combination of economic and political struggles and lead the widest mass of toilers to armed insurrection for Soviet Power.

* * * *

In the tactical line for battle which it gave to the Communist Parties, the Twelfth Plenum of the E.C.C.I. emphasised the fact that "the economic struggle of the proletariat . . . is, at the present stage, in the overwhelming majority of capitalist countries, the *fundamental link* for leading the masses to the forthcoming big revolutionary battles," that "only by relying on the everyday interests of the masses can the Communist Parties defend and strengthen the position of the working class, and lead it up to ever higher forms of struggle and to the decisive battles for the dictatorship of the proletariat. When the proper conditions for it exist, the preparation and calling of a *mass political strike* is one of the most essential and immediate links in the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat."

A great extension of the economic struggle has taken place since the Twelfth Plenum in a series of countries; which often grows into revolutionary battles. What is there new in the development of these struggles during the time which has passed since the Twelfth Plenum?

In the first place, there has been a further extension of the strike movement; in some coun-

ies 1933 *is the record year for strike struggles.* Poland the strike wave was undoubtedly reater than in all the preceding years of the isis. In 1932 there were 460 economic strikes th 648,244 strikers and 5,594,643 strike-days; *the first three-quarters* of 1933 there were 261 rikes with 524,790 strikers and 5,647,000 rike-days. In the fourth quarter we see a new vell of the strike wave (the Lodz metal workers' rike, the Gdynia builders' and the Posen tram en's strike. In the U.S.A., the main citadel of caying capitalism, this year is also a record. he strike-wave has, particularly in the last three onths (over 400,000 strikers) exceeded all the cords of the last 10-12 years, etc. And in ascist Germany we had this year 1,195 strikes, spite of the furious terror of Fascism. In spite a certain decrease in the number of strikes, the mber of strikers has grown in Japan and Great itain, as compared with 1932. In Great Britain ere were in 1932 219 strikes, with 67,500 rikers, while in 1933 there were 201 strikes th 77,200 strikers. The number of strike-days s also increased; it now reaches 650,000. In pan, there were, in the first half of 1932, 944 rikes with 48,000 strikers, and in the second lf, 982 strikes with 49,500 strikers; while in e first half of 1933 there were 843 strikes em-acing 53,200 workers. During the last few onths the number of strikes and striking rkers has also been growing.

Another new thing is that the strikes in some untries are of the nature of *large-scale* battles. spite of the capitalists' policy of attacking the rkers by preventing the extension of the strike ave and the transition to higher, more acute rms of struggle, this year there has been an crease in the *frequency of strikes in whole anches of industry,* moreover, in the *basic dustries.* The strikes are very hard-fought and ubborn; the struggles go on for months, often rning into general strikes and spreading to ole districts. Such occurrences take place not ly in the United States and Poland (strikes in metal and textile industry) but also in Great itain (the majority of miners', metal and trans-rt workers' strikes), in Spain, Hungary and ance (the Strasburg and seamen's strikes); re the strikes also last for months. This is a ture even of some strikes in Czecho-Slovakia e three and a half month strike in Rosice and general strike in Krumlov) where the move-nt has, during the last year, owing to the portunist tendencies which began to be mani-ted in the Party, weakened in places where gantic strike struggle took place in the past.

Secondly, the new and most characteristic ture of the strike struggle since the time of the Twelfth Plenum is that, in spite of the further intensification of the economic crisis, the workers not only offer resistance to the furious attack of capital, *but go on to counter-attack,* and with greater success in struggle. During this year there has been a great *increase in the number of strikes* of an emphatically *attacking* character, with regard to both the demands for improving the workers' conditions and to the actual course of the struggle, and also a *considerable increase in the number of successful strikes,* due first and foremost to the increased activity of the Communists and their leading rôle in the strikes. It is highly characteristic that these offensive and successful struggles take place *not only, and not even mainly* in the branches of industry where a certain increase in production, of a war and inflation nature, has taken place during the last year (textiles and mining). According to preliminary data, almost half (43 per cent.) of the strikes in France were of an offensive nature, while 50 per cent. of all strikes ended in victory for the workers. The whole meaning and importance of these facts become still clearer if one takes into account, in the first place, the fact that the data for the corresponding months of 1932 show only 25 per cent. of offensive strikes and 26 per cent. of successful strikes, and, secondly, that the economic crisis in France too has deepened and intensified since 1932. Characteristic for France are not only the victories of the textile workers in Castres and of the metal workers in Marseilles, and not even so much the prolonged strike at the Citroen works, which ended in only partial material success for the workers, but played a big part in the resistance offered by the proletariat of France to the extensive attack of the capitalists. Characteristic is the *Strasburg strike,* which was an offensive from the very beginning, and which in spite of the opportunist errors of the local C.G.T.U. leadership, quickly grew to be a general political revolutionary strike of great importance.

In Poland 77.8 per cent. of the strikes which took place this year ended in the victory of the workers, as against 59.1 per cent. in 1932. The Lodz textile workers' strike, which embraced 110,000 workers, is characteristic. It formed *highly important revolutionary action on the part of the Polish proletariat after the establishment of Pilsudski's Fascist dictatorship.* This strike began as a *counter-offensive,* with demands for the wages and working conditions which existed before the economic crisis, in 1928, with the demand that all capitalists should sign and keep a collective agreement identical with that of 1928. The Lodz textile workers *were victorious* after four weeks of revolutionary

struggle; struggle which subsequently played an enormous part in the unleashing of the economic and political struggles of the proletariat and peasantry of Poland.

In Fascist Germany, even after May 13, when a law threatening the death penalty for striking was passed, the majority of the strikes which took place in the factories and labour camps* ended in victory for the workers.

In the U.S.A., even after the passing by the Roosevelt government of the law forbidding strikes, the majority of strikes, including the great miners' strike of 70,000 in Pennsylvania, are declared under the slogan of higher wages, recognition of the trade unions and workers' right of organisation, and are counter-attacks in character. Most of the strikes ended in victory for the workers.

In Japan the number of offensive strikes (demands for higher wages) has grown considerably (34 per cent.). On November 15th a strike was declared by builders engaged in the construction of a Japanese bank, who put forward a demand for a 20 per cent. wage increase.

In Spain, the strike of 100,000 trade employees in Barcelona ended *in the victory of the strikers.*

The growing movement of the masses, *the enormous increase in the number of offensive and successful strikes, have smashed to pieces the capitulationist theory of the Social-Fascists. the counter-revolutionary Trotskyists, the Right renegades and opportunists that counter-offensive and successful strikes are impossible during a crisis.* At the same time, strikes of an offensive nature, strikes which end in the material victory of the workers, not only defeat attempts to secure a capitalist way out of the crisis, but lead inevitably to the further extension of the struggles, to the transition to higher, more acute and more revolutionary forms of struggle, and their growth under the present circumstances forms a powerful factor in the acceleration of the growth of the revolutionary crisis.

A third new feature is that *the revolutionary character of the economic and political struggles of the proletariat* has grown still more than before the Twelfth Plenum. This fact is expressed in the increased revolutionary importance of the economic struggles themselves, in so far as it is precisely with the end of the relative stabilisation of capitalism that the end of the period of social reforms, as it is called, has come, when "the struggle for the most elementary requirements of the masses brings them into conflict with the very foundations of the existence of capitalism" (Twelfth Plenum), in so far as economic strikes have been forbidden by law in the Fascist countries, and in some countries undergoing fascisation. This increased revolutionary character of the struggles also shows in the fact that strikes which originally were economic are rapidly converted into political, in the union of the economic and political strikes, when the workers *simultaneously* put forward *economic and political demands,* in a still greater interweaving of economic and poltical strikes, in a more rapid transition to *general* strikes and from strikes to revolutionary demonstrations on the street, to barricade fights against the whole apparatus of bourgeois violence. It finds expression in the increased relative revolutionary importance of strikes which begin as political ones, of action on the streets, of unemployed hunger marches and, finally, in the enormous revolutionising influence on the peasantry and the urban toiling masses which the class struggles of the proletariat have acquired especially now.

In Germany, ever since Hitler came to power, there have been over 400 *political* strikes, principally in the small and middle enterprises; moreover, political strikes dominated, reaching in February 75 per cent. and in April 90 per cent. of the total number of strikes. Of the strikes which took place after the law passed in May which forbade strikes under threat of the death penalty, even those which began with economic demands are of great revolutionary importance.

In Poland, the militant mass demonstrations of up to forty thousand during the Lodz textile strike, mass beating of spies and secret service agents in the demonstrations, bloody battles with the police, when there were some killed and dozens wounded, solidarity strikes in other towns and the one-day general solidarity strike in Lodz, all resembled the revolutionary action of the Lodz proletariat during the years of the revolution, in 1918-19. An analogous picture is presented by the bloody battles with the police and the solidarity strikes during the Belostok strike, which began under the direct influence of the Lodz strike and lasted two and a half months.

In France, the strike of two thousand builders in Strasburg, beginning at the end of July as an economic strike, was transformed, beginning with August 1 — International Anti-War Day— into a general strike of twenty thousand workers, and took on a definitely expressed political character, although the Party organisation showed itself unable to raise this struggle against oppressing French imperialism to the level of *conscious* struggle against Chauvinism

* According to preliminary and incomplete data, 108 strikes in factories and 280 in labour camps have taken place since May 17.

ıd the danger of war, for the national liberation Alsace-Lorraine. This strike was accom-nied by powerful demonstrations, in which the asses of the toilers also took part; there were en barricade fights which resulted in several ndred wounded and mass beating of the gen-rmerie. The soldiers and engineering corps lled up refused to take part in the fight against e strikers. All these facts bear witness to the ghly revolutionary nature of this strike.

In Great Britain, the strike of the London smen acquired a political character in the very ginning. The strike of 18,000 miners in South ales also had a political character, although a peculiar kind—the workers struck in pro-st against the intention of the capitalists to osecute the workers for alleged failure to keep e agreement.

In the U.S.A. the enormous wave of strikes - higher pay is also directed against Roose-lt's Fascist Industrial Recovery Act, which bids strikes and fixes a rigid scale of pay. irectly after the passing of Roosevelt's laws the ass struggles were extended greatly and quired a vivid political character. The strikes w either begin as political or advance both onomic and political demands.

In Czecho-Slovakia, too, where the Party is nsiderably behindhand, an increase has taken ce during the last year in the number of short litical strikes and of demonstrations. The one-y general strike of 12,000 workers in Krumau s of a political nature from the very ginning (demands for the freeing and reinstate-nt at work of the arrested Red members of factory committee). The general strike, gether with a powerful demonstration in ich all the strikers took part, compelled the pitalists to desist from their attacks and acts provocation. All these facts bear witness to great possibilities for the development of onomic and political struggles of which the P.C. has failed to make use. The revolution-character of the struggles which have taken ce lately is peculiar for its variety of forms struggle, the appearance of ever new and rper forms of struggle, which should first of be enumerated, the *seizure of factories*, quently connected with mass fights and ular battles against the police and troops, as Poland and Roumania; unemployed hunger rches, connected with sharp forms of uggle, such as the confiscation on a large le of food, clothing, coal, etc., in the big res and warehouses (Poland), with conflicts h the police, etc., political strikes connected h political demonstrations; armed battles of rkers' defence detachments with Fascist detachments and Fascist strikebreakers; partial barricade fights, etc.

We are entering the period which V. I. Lenin prophesied as early as 1912:

> "When an analogous moment of the maturing of the revolution approaches in Europe (there it will be a Socialist revolution, and not a bourgeois-democratic one as in our country), then the proletariat of the countries of most highly developed capitalism will develop incomparably greater energy in revolutionary strikes, demonstrations, and armed struggle against the defenders of wage-slavery."*

A somewhat new way of putting the question of the development of the political and economic struggles and of the relationship between them, and also of the mass political strike must be adopted now.

What has been characteristic lately of the "anti-crisis" *Fascist* measures of the bourgeois governments will very soon come down on the masses with still greater force: compulsory arbitration, extraordinary measures and laws forbidding strikes, abolition of unemployed benefits; "forced labour camps"; introduction of the reduced working week; monstrous intensification of labour. So also will the system of government measures for further wage reductions, for enslaving the peasantry by means of capitalist monopolies and heavier tax burdens, the inflation policy of the bourgeois governments, which accelerates the pauperisation of the masses of the people and the economic disintegration, the latter hastening the preparation of a new imperialist war, and, first and foremost, of counter-revolutionary war against the Soviet Union.

Under these circumstances, when Fascism becomes the international tendency in the capitalist countries, when monopoly capital carries through its advance more and more by means of government measures of terror, under these circumstances (*as the experience of the past year has already shown*) the development of the economic struggles brings the workers into conflict with all the forces of the bourgeoisie and its state apparatus, with Social-Democracy and the reformist bureaucracy, and faces us with the task of revolutionising still more the struggle of the workers for their daily demands, of *extending* it, of raising it to a higher stage, and transforming it into direct political struggle against the very capitalist system, against the capitalist state.

A particularly great historic importance attaches to the task of organising the millions of

* Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XVI.

the unemployed for the fight for their everyday demands (benefits, social insurance, against forced labour, etc) for the struggle which brings them into immediate conflict with the bourgeois state. The task is to pass over to higher, more acute forms of struggle (mass confiscation of food, clothing and fuel supplies), co-ordinating action by the unemployed with the struggle of the whole proletariat and the toilers for a revolutionary way out of the crisis.

It is still more necessary than before to combine the struggle for work and bread with the struggle for political demands, for the right to strike, the freedom of mass proletarian organisations and of the workers' press, and, which is of particular importance, with the struggle against the attempts of Fascism to smash the revolutionary vanguard of the working class — the Communist Party. This kind of struggle, when the workers advance both economic and political demands, will be a very important lever in establishing a militant united front under the leadership of the Communists.

The development of political struggles on a broad basis of economic strikes, and also the organisation of leadership of the strikes which are political from the beginning (strikes against the bloody violence of the police, against unrestrained Fascist terror, etc.) become the most important fighting task of the day.

Of particular importance for the present period is V. I. Lenin's statement on the interdependence of the economic and political struggle, which says that "without close connection between them, a really broad and really mass movement is impossible,"* that the strength of the movement during the epoch of attack is precisely that political strikes are built up on a broad basis, in conjunction with no less weak economic strikes. In his theses on the revolutionary upsurge of 1912, Lenin emphasised once more the fact that:

"All . . . forms of the union and interweaving of the economic and political struggle are a condition of and security for the strength of the movement, for they create the revolutionary mass strike."†

The rapid fascisation of the majority of capitalist countries, which accentuates all the forms of exploitation and oppression, but at the same time sharpens all forms of the class struggle, compels and will compel mass political struggles to be developed ever more frequently. An enormous importance is acquired to-day by mass political action, particularly in connection with the increased war preparations of the imperialists and the imperialist wars which are already going on, as in the Far East. Exposing all the secrets of the preparation of a new imperialist war and of counter-revolutionary war against the Soviet Union, exposing the furious growth of armaments, exposing the chauvinist incitement and the Pacifist deception carried on, in the first place by their "own" bourgeoisie, the Communists must approach with still greater determination to the organisation of mass political anti-war strikes, combining them with other anti-war actions (retarding of transport of war equipment, non-fulfilment of war orders for the imperialist countries at war, mass demonstrations against war manœuvres, etc.

The method of the mass political strike has won great popularity among the working masses. This explains why the Social-Fascists hasten to a "Left" manœuvre word-play with the slogan of the general strike. The task of the Communists is, by means of increasing their political activity to the utmost, to strengthen, on the basis of extending the united front from below in the struggle for the everyday demands of the masses, their initiative in the organisation and independent leadership of mass political battles. If, under the pressure of the masses, the Social-Fascists succeed in snatching the initiative formally to declare a general strike, the task of the Communists is to fight for the leadership of the struggle, against the sabotage and treachery of the Social-Fascists, for the deepening and intensification of the struggle.

The experiences of the struggle during recent years have fully confirmed the law formulated by Lenin, which shows the dialectical connection between the economic and political struggles.

> "This means that at the beginning of the movement many workers put economic struggle in the foreground, and at the time of the greatest upsurge it is the contrary. But the *connection* between the economic and political struggle existed *all the time*. I repeat, without this connection a really great movement, and the realisation of its great aims, is impossible."*

The point now is that political strikes, political battles, must and will come into the foreground, must and will become dominant, and the task of the Communists is to organise these political battles on the basis of a still broader, still firmer basis of mass economic battles.

The experience of Germany during the last two years has shown particularly well how the rapid development of political events faces the

* Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XV.
† Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XVI.

* Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XV.

letariat with the necessity of reacting to the ws of the class enemy ever more frequently h the weapon of political strike and mass et action, has proved that the C.P.G. was ht in adopting its line of mass political ggle against the advance of Fascism. In many, where, in spite of the savage terror of brown bandits, a new revolutionary upsurge begun and is growing, and the number of kes and street actions of the heroic German rkers under the leadership of their heroic Comnist Party is increasing more rapidly than the ining sceptics and opportunists think, a rapid nsition to an extensive counter-attack and the elerated maturing of the revolutionary crisis possible. It is difficult to foretell where, and connection with what concrete circumstances, present chain of terror will be broken, where rising general hatred and indignation of the assed masses will overflow first—whether in nection with a new crying act of provocation, ror and violence on the part of the Fascist pressors of the people, or perhaps with the vitable general attack on the wages of the rkers in the face of the obvious bankruptcy Hitler's methods of "saving" capitalist nomy. However painful the ways in which revolutionary crisis in Germany matures, the sent situation is already facing the German letariat and its steeled Communist cohorts the new and higher task of unleashing the ryday economic and political struggles of the letariat, with the aim of declaring a general tical strike and organising our forces for ed overthrow of Hitler's bloody dictatorship. Fascist Poland, where in numerous strikes proletariat blocks the road of the capitalists' ck, where the mass revolutionary strike has ome the main lever for establishing the hegeny of the proletariat and drawing the reserves he millions of the peasantry, and of the toiling ses of the oppressed peoples, into the ggle against the imperialist and landlord loitation and oppression, the line of a national eral strike taken by the Communist Party of and has proved absolutely correct. The erience of the strike struggles in Poland has ed to smash and prove the falseness of the tulatory theories of the alleged impossibility carrying through victorious economic strikes onditions of the economic crisis. This experi- also teaches the workers that *it is impossible etain the positions already won without passon to higher forms of struggle, that every ck of the capitalists is followed by a still e intense, although sometimes circuitous one, which the means of government terror and trary judgment are still sharper.* From this it follows that the C.P.P. must increase the still insufficient political activity and initiative of the Party organisations in the development and independent leadership of the political struggles, must co-ordinate single strikes with still greater determination than up to now, must combine them oftener with mass street demonstrations, and direct all the forms of mass struggle in the towns and the countryside into the channel of the general political strike, preparation for which must be connected up with the task of organising the forces for an armed uprising of the workers, peasants and soldiers against the Fascist dictatorship of Pilsudski.

It would evidently be premature to call for a rising in the weakest places of the imperialist chain at the present moment—in Germany, Poland, Spain, etc., while the revolutionary crisis has not yet begun, while the respective Communist Parties have not yet won to their side the majority of the proletariat, in the Leninist sense. *But it is necessary to see, even to-day, the connection of the mass strikes with the highest form of struggle—the uprising,* to convince the working masses of the necessity for the uprising and prepare for it, and first and foremost by means of strengthening still more the bonds which bind the Party with the working class, by means of persistent everyday work in all spheres of the life of the toiling masses, the unemployed, the working youth and the exploited peasantry.

> "While supporting and extending the attack of the masses," Lenin taught the Russian proletariat in 1917 ". . . and explaining the necessity and inevitability of the uprising, we must restrain and prevent premature attempts of this kind."*

The *unevenly* maturing world revolutionary crisis has put on the order of the day the question of the struggle for a Soviet government. In the weakest links of the capitalist chain the Communists must in all economic and political battles confront the masses with the question of power. In these countries our Parties must begin now to prepare the conditions for the decisive struggles, for the armed overthrow of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.

The Communist Parties of all countries must now in the course of the daily mass revolutionary struggle make known to every worker, every peasant, the programme, drafted concretely for each country, of the Soviet revolutionary way out of the crisis, the programme of Socialism, embodied in the world historic victories of the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. Our slogans and demands

* Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XV.

can and must become closest of all to the millions of toilers, for these slogans and demands are truthful, and life itself convinces the masses more and more completely every day that they are right.

The Communists must point out to the masses that not only is our programme of the way out of the crisis right, but that they will carry it into life immediately after overthrowing the yoke of capital, as soon as the proletariat wins a government of the Soviets.

The power of the exploiters lies in the means of production and the banks, which are in their hands. The dictatorship of the proletariat will break this power once and for all, will take away from them what they have gained by robbery—the factories, land and banks.

The capitalists shut down factory after factory and condemn millions of unemployed to starvation. The Communists, after seizing power, will immediately open the factories, mines and metallurgical plants, will break down the resistance and sabotage of the capitalists and provide work for all the unemployed. The Fascists drive the working youth into prison-like forced labour camps. The Communists, after they have seized power, will open to the working youth the road to the schools and to free creative and productive labour, and will send to the forced labour camps all the parasites, drones, exploiters, gendarmes and oppressors of the masses of the people. The children of the proletariat go about barefoot and in rags. The Communists, after seizing power, will immediately confiscate by a decree of the Soviet government the shoe and clothing factories and the large stores in favour of the proletarian state, and will clothe those who are barefoot and ragged. Hundreds of thousands of workers and labourers perish from bad air and overcrowding in kennels, in the landlords' beggarly barracks for the workers, in cellars and garrets; the Soviet government will, under the leadership of the Communists, confiscate the large buildings, the palaces and villas, and will make them the homes of the homeless, making the middle class, who occupy large houses, share them with the destitute.

The poor peasant starves, for he cannot make a living out of a beggarly piece of land which often cannot cover even his minimum wants. The Communists will immediately, after seizing power, confiscate the landlords, church and state lands and hand them over to the peasants, without right of repurchase. The Soviet government will give the oppressed peoples the right to self-determination up to secession.

The bourgeoisie has at its disposal a powerful apparatus which keeps millions of the exploited fearful and obedient. The dictatorship of the proletariat will smash to pieces the machine of the bourgeois state; it will disarm the bourgeoisie and its hired Fascist murderers, will arm the working people and create the strong safeguard of Socialist society against all exploiters and parasites — the Red Army of the workers and peasants.

The Communists must go into the masses with this militant programme of the way out of the hell of capitalist crisis. When the slogans of our programme become the slogans of millions, they will become an invincible material force. By the organisation of the daily economic and political struggle, we must unite around our programme of the struggle for power, the only programme which will save the masses from hunger, poverty, unemployment and the violence of the exploiters, the decisive sections of the working class and the exploited peasantry, and inspire them with belief in our strength.

Our programme of the revolutionary way out of the crisis cannot be bare propaganda, detached from the daily struggle. Its concrete demands must suit the conditions of each capitalist country. It must show concretely how we shall overcome the specific difficulties of each country, which the Social-Fascists use to frighten the masses away from revolution. The programme must inspire and convince the masses in the course of their daily struggle against the advance of capital. And, at the same time, the latest demands of the masses, which we must make use of in order really to head and develop them and extend the daily struggle, must lead to the programme of the revolutionary way out of the crisis, which moves the whole labour movement forward and raises it to the level of conscious struggle for power. That is the most important thing of the present time

Under the present circumstances, when the world revolutionary crisis is maturing rapidly, when the *tasks* of the Communists have grown enormously too, the sharpening of all the forms of the Communist Party's struggle has achieved important successes. It has, nevertheless, failed to overcome belatedness in the struggle against the bourgeoisie, against its Fascist dictatorship, and against its principal social support—Social-Fascism, in the contest for the majority of the working class which was indicated by the Twelfth Plenum. The Communist Parties have not overcome the backwardness pointed out by the Twelfth Plenum in the transition from mainly agitational-propagandist methods to methods of the *organisational* preparation and leadership of the economic and political struggles, of organisational *consolidation* of their influence; and first

foremost in the question of concentrating
on large factories, strengthening work in
reformist trade unions, etc. And this back-
dness cannot be done away with *unless*
ortunism in all its forms, and first of all open
nt opportunism *is overcome in a ruthless*
on two fronts. For that reason, under
ent circumstances, when the world has come
to face with a new round of revolutions and
s, when the Fascist methods of crushing the
lutionary proletariat and the manœuvres of
al-Fascism have strengthened extraordin-
, *Right opportunism is, more than ever, the*
n danger.

t the present moment, what are the mani-
ations of Right and "Left" opportunism in
question of the economic and political
ggles of the proletariat?

the extending economic and political
ggles Right opportunism is manifested, first
ll, in rejection of the leading rôle of the Party
stablishing the united front in these struggles,
ttempts to conceal the face of the Party and
nake a *bloc* with the Social-Fascists, to make
nited front from above; it is manifested in
erestimation of the importance of, and resist-
e to, the extension and unification of the
les of the proletariat, to the raising of econo-
struggles to the level of conscious political
ggle, to the interweaving of economic and
tical struggles. In denying that a number of
kes can be political strikes from the begin-
; it is manifested, finally, in a scornfully
antic attitude towards new, sharper forms of
ggle, in rejection and under-estimation of
s political struggles under present condi-
s, in "tailism" and narrow economism in
stions of the general strike, and the prepara-
of transition from it to armed uprising.
se ideas are formed in the minds of the Right
ortunists because they under-estimate and
that the world revoltuionary crisis is
uring, because of their fatalist idea of the
itable victory of Fascism (the epoch of
ism), because of their idea of the impossi-
y of breaking through the front of Fascism
re it collapses of itself, because of their
tulation to the bourgeoisie.

Left" opportunism finds expression, in the
loping economic and political struggles, in
emptuous under-estimation of the united
t from below in opening up the struggle; in
r-estimation of the great importance of
in the reformist trade unions, of the neces-
for developing the struggle for partial
omic and political demands, in under-estim-
n of the revolutionising importance of the
omic struggle, in isolating it from
and counterposing it to the political struggle, in an adventurous playing with the armed uprising when the objective and subjective conditions are not ripe for it, etc. These ideas of the "Left" opportunists arise from their denial of the existence of objective difficulties in the development of the revolutionary crisis, from their sectarian flight from Bolshevik work in the masses in order to overcome these difficulties, which also lead to capitulation before the class enemy, though from the other end.

The experience of the economic and political struggles which have developed lately shows the increased danger first and foremost of Right opportunism.

This is shown clearest of all in the case of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia.

Right opportunism, which this year showed itself in some of the links of the Party in the leadership of the struggles of the proletariat, loss of the Communist Party's face, a tendency to make a *bloc* with the Social-Democrats instead of extending the united front in order to isolate the Social-Fascists from the masses, neglect of the task of timely transition from the economic struggles to higher, sharper forms of struggle, of combining them with the political struggle (while at the same time pretending that a passive form of struggle — the starvation strike in the coal districts—was the highest form of struggle), impermissible under-estimation of the importance of, and passiveness in the organisation of mass political struggles against the open Fascists' dictatorship which the Czecho-Slovakian bourgeoisie is now establishing together with the Social-Democracy — all this led to a relaxing during the last few months of the revolutionary mass struggle of the Czecho-Slovakian proletariat, to a weakening in some districts and factories of the influence of our Party, which a year ago successfully led large-scale strike struggles against the advance of capital.

In France, too, the face of the Party is often not to be seen in the strike movement. Of particular importance is the Right opportunism manifested during the famous strike in Strasburg. The Party organisation not only under-estimated the political and revolutionary nature of this strike, but allowed a state of affairs where our comrades made a *bloc*, a united front from above with the Social-Fascist trade union leaders when the leadership of the strike was organised; the strike committee was established on a parity basis and the Party was thus in a minority. Fear of breaking this united front from above with the reformist bosses, the theory that the strike cannot be led without them has

led to the capitulation of representatives of our Red trade unions in the strike committee to the reformist leaders, and to their voting for the reformists' proposal of submitting the matter to government arbitration, in spite of the decision of the general meeting of the strikers. This full-blooded Right opportunism turned into simple renegation when our representatives in the strike committee, still for the sake of unity with the Social-Fascist bosses, voted for the employers' proposal of censuring certain newspapers (the "Humanité") for their campaign during the outstanding Strasburg revolutionary strike. Under-estimation of the political character of the struggles which were taking place, passiveness, lack of initiative in their organisation, took place in a whole number of other countries, and particularly in the U.S.A. and Great Britain (the busmen's strike in London). Insufficient political activeness and initiative in the organisation of mass political struggles and their leadership form one of the principal weaknesses of our Party organisation.

While intensifying the ruthless struggle against "Leftist" opportunist theories that the end of the struggle for the partial demands of the working class has come, against theories which under-estimate the revolutionising importance of the partial struggle, which under-estimate the fact that mass political struggles must be based on a broad and firm basis of economic struggles, that precisely that will form the force of the revolutionary upsurge, we must at the same time declare a ruthless struggle against Right opportunist theories in the question of the general strike and of the organisation of mass political struggles, theories which find their expression in "tailism" and coarse economism in approaching these questions.

Under-estimating the intensification of the mass revolutionary struggle and failing to understand the dialectical connection of the combination and dependence of all new forms of struggle, opportunists conduct operations by means of "tailist" diagrams. In these typically "tailist" paper ideas must be included the attitude towards economic struggles as an isolated stage of the struggle of the proletariat which it is necessary to pass through completely, that is, until the whole working masses of a certain city or district have been drawn into the economic struggle, and that only then should one begin political strikes and mass political action. In the category of theories close to this "tailist economism" must be included also the view, which the leadership of the Communist Party of Poland smashed recently, that even the general strike is a certain kind of "mechanical" sum of economic strikes. The same leadership exposed and smashed the "stairs theory" related to it, which views the development of the general strike "from step to step," a "theory" which denies the possibility of independent organisation and preparation of a general strike on the part of the Communist Party without the preliminary drawing into the strike of all the separate groups of the working class (e.g., in connection with the Warsaw tram men's strike in 1931). These theories are now spreading in other sections of the Comintern, as for instance in Austria, where the situation is that of the eve of a general political strike.

The opportunists make the question of the political strike *exclusively* that of "the growth of economic into political strikes," under-estimating the fact that we at the same time have cases of the contrary, i.e., of political strikes which are replaced by a wave of economic strikes.

The narrow economism of the opportunists also finds expression in the fact that they do not see that a whole number of mass revolutionary strikes are political strikes from the beginning, are strikes which are directed with all their force against the Fascist government, against the state power of the bourgeoisie; that a whole number of strikes are accompanied by mass militant action which unites the economic and political demands of the working class which may, under the leadership of the Communist Party, lead to the decisive struggles for the whole programme of the revolutionary way out of the crisis, to the battles for the armed overthrow of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Not only does the strengthening of all forms of political struggle not weaken the struggle for the daily demands of the exploited masses, but, on the contrary, it increases the extent of the struggle, rouses and draws into the struggle even the most backward and down-trodden sections of the toilers.

Not long ago, on the eve of the Twelfth Plenum, some comrades advanced the view that the time has not quite come to think of the general political strike, that it means to create a sort of panacea and so on. But, in practice, the live mass struggle has shown and is showing precisely the contrary — namely, how acute the question has become. The danger is precisely in making an opportunist fetish of the general strike, in under-estimation of the necessity for combining the general strike with preparation of the armed uprising, to which it should be subordinated.

Mistakes which were based on the under-estimation of the subordinate auxiliary rôle of the general strike in relation to the armed upris-

ing took place recently in the Communist Party of Poland. The Central Committeee of the C.P.P. offered determined resistance to tendencies which tried to bring into the slogans of the Party, in connection with a certain general demonstrative strike against the attempt to do away with the remnants of social insurance, such points as "The general strike right up to victory!" or "By means of the general strike we shall overthrow the government of the landlords and capitalists!" The first externally "radical" slogan indirectly, and the other directly, spread the opportunist illusions that the government of Fascism can be overthrown by means of the general strike alone.

By uprooting opportunism in all its forms and manifestations in a ruthless fight on two fronts, and first of all open Right opportunism — the principal danger at the present stage—the Communist Parties will overcome their lagging and will be able to bring the masses up to victorious revolution for a Soviet government, for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

THE MOSCOW BOLSHEVIKS ON THE EVE OF AND DURING THE OCTOBER DAYS OF 1917

By O. Piatnitsky.

(*Continuation*)

3.—HESITATION OF THE MILITARY-REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE. SURRENDER OF THE KREMLIN AND THE OPENING OF HOSTILITIES.

THE initiative in the fighting directly after the receipt of the news concerning the capture of power in Petrograd was in the hands of the military-revolutionary council.

The offensive organised in the districts began on October 25th prior to the receipt of a telephone order from the Party centre.

At the same time the Party centre, at about noon of October 25th, issued orders to occupy the main post office, telegraph and telephone exchange.

However, in the fulfilment of this order a misunderstanding occurred. Next to the post office and telegraph was located the inter-urban telephone exchange. Upon occuying it, the detachment considered its task to have been fulfilled, whereas in reality it was necessary to occupy the central city telephone exchange in the Militinsky pereulok, which it did not do.

From October 26th until November 8th the bourgeois newspapers, *Russkoye Slovo, Utro Rossii, Russkie Vedomosti, Ranneya Utro,* were not published.

Even before the end of the meeting of the Plenum of the Moscow Soviets, at midnight of October 26th, the military-revolutionary committee met at the building of the Soviet and took up its work.

The Party centre, which met at the same time in the same building, adopted a number of decisions, dealing with the capture of the Kremlin, in which was the arsenal, the seizure of the State bank and railway stations, etc. These orders were conveyed to the Bolshevik members of the military-revolutionary committee for execution and were carried out by them through the military-revolutionary committee, contrary to the protests of the Mensheviks. These decisions were conveyed to the staff of the military-revolutionary committee and to the executive committee of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies for execution.

Within the Kremlin were stationed the 56th reserve infantry regiment and about 1,500 members of the arsenal corps who were of Bolshevik sentiments. At the same time, however, the headquarters of Colonel Ryabtsev, the commander of the forces, the staff of the Ukrainian forces headed by Colonel Onufrienko, two armoured cars, many officers and the First Officers' Schools were also quartered there.

It was necessary to strengthen the Kremlin garrison by soldiers devoted to the Soviets; the choice fell upon the 193rd reserve infantry regiment which was quartered in the Khamovniki barracks and which was to be reformed, i.e., despatched to the front by an order of Ryabtsev of October 15th.

On the night of October 25th, E. Yaroslavsky, who was appointed Commissar of the Kremlin, went to Khamovniki and brought a company of soldiers which at 5 a.m. arrived in the Kremlin and received arms from the arsenal.

Upon receipt of news to the effect that the *Junkers* had occupied the riding school and city Duma at 3 a.m., October 26th, the military-revolutionary committee, despite Menshevik protests, despatched to the printing shop of the *Izvestia of*

the Moscow Soviet an order to the garrison stating that:

"The entire Moscow garrison must be immediately brought into fighting readiness, each army unit must be prepared to march out on the first order of the military-revolutionary committee . . . . . No orders coming from others than the military-revolutionary committee or not bearing its signature are to be executed."

On October 26th all the workers of the military-revolutionary committee, with the exception of those on H.Q. duty, proceeded to the districts.

In all the districts the Soviets elected military-revolutionary committees. The Bolshevik section of the district military-revolutionary committees proceeded to act immediately without waiting for the sanction of the district soviets.

The most painful question in the districts was that of arming the workers. For this reason the district Party centres and military-revolutionary committees saw to it that trucks should be sent immediately to the Kremlin under the protection of the Red Guards with the demand for arms. Only three of these trucks succeeded in reaching their destination, as, after a company of the 193rd infantry reserve regiment arrived there, the *Junkers* surrounded the Kremlin, stopping the trucks arriving from the districts, and arresting the Red Guards who came as their escorts.

In the evening of October 26th, in response to a demand from O. Berzin, the Kremlin Commandant, twelve machine-guns with ammunition and 70,000 rifle cartridges were issued to him. These machine-guns were immediately placed on the Kremlin walls, by order of Berzin.

In every district persons in military uniforms passing through the streets had to give up their arms. The arms were taken away not only by Red Guard patrols, but also by volunteers, who were thus acquiring arms to participate in the coming battles. There were cases when Red Guards with rifles, minus cartridges, disarmed officers and *Junkers* who were excellently armed.

On October 26th all the police stations were also occupied.

Only the police headquarters of Moscow, which subsequently served as one of the most important positions of the Whites during the *Junker* offensive upon the Moscow Soviet, remained unoccupied.

The executive committee of the police trade unions was on the side of the soviets. The Bolsheviks conducted work among the ranks of the police and entered their membership in accordance with a decision of the Moscow Committee of the Party adopted in April. As a result the bulk of of the police followed the Bolsheviks.

In connection with the action of the *Junkers* in throwing a cordon around the Kremlin and intercepting the trucks sent to the Kremlin for arms, the Party centre at 12 noon sent the following telephone message to the district Party organisations:

"The staff headed by Ryabtsev is assuming the offensive. Our automobiles are being stopped and attempts have been made to arrest members of the military-revolutionary committee. This situation should be made clear at the meetings in the factories and mills and the masses should be immediately called upon to make a demonstration of real force before the staff. It is therefore necessary for the masses to begin to act independently under the leadership of district centres with a view to the actual establishment of the power of the Soviets in the districts. Occupy the Commissariats."

The Moscow Committee of the Bolshevik Party on October 26th issued an appeal to the workers and soldiers to take up the offensive against the staff of the Moscow military district in order to release the revolutionary soldiers who were locked up in the Kremlin by the *Junkers*.

At 4 p.m., October 26th, the district military-revolutionary committees received a telephone message from the centre proposing "to refrain from offensive actions."

Apparently such an order had been issued in connection with negotiations opened between V. F. Nogin and Ryabtsev.

As a result of these negotiations "the two sides came to the conclusion that all actions carried out by both parties must be annulled. The *Junkers* will be removed and the military-revolutionary committee will withdraw its units" from the Kremlin (i.e., the company of the 193rd regiment). "The representatives of the military-revolutionary committee are to send a representative to headquarters."

In the evening of October 26th a special meeting was held by the Moscow committee, district committee and regional bureau of the Party in view of the fact that sharp differences had developed between the members of the military-revolutionary committee and the Party centre on the negotiations with Ryabtsev. This meeting, after a serious exchange of views, passed a categorical decision to discontinue all negotiations with Ryabtsev and issued orders to the military centres to open a determined offensive. In the evening of the 26th the negotiations were discontinued.

In the morning of October 27th the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries began to circulate rumours about the fall of the Council of People's Commissars and the victory of Kerensky. The military-revolutionary committee instructed P. G. Smidovich and O. A. Piatnitsky to get into con-

ct with Petrograd and ascertain the real state affairs.

The two comrades went to the hall of the oscow Bureau of the E.C. of the All-Russian ailwaymen's Union (which was then located in e building of the Gendarmerie Department of e Nikolaev Railway) for the purpose of lephoning to some member of the government in etrograd, or the military-revolutionary committee. The right Socialist-Revolutionary Garr, member of the union, did not allow the representatives of the Moscow military-revolutionary mmittee to use the telephone, but started gotiations personally, telling them only what thought necessary.

For this reason Piatnitsky, who had conducted arty work among the railwaymen of the Moscow nction, remained in the military-revolutionary mmittee of the railway district in order to tablish reliable connections with Petrograd over e head of the Railwaymen's Union. In this he ally succeeded. Since the wire by which the ailwaymen's Union was connected with the inistry of Ways and Communications in Petroad passed through the station of the Northern ailway, the military-revolutionary committee of s railway was not only able to ring up Petroad itself (it called on the telephone the member the Executive Committee of the Railwaymen's ion, Khrulev, a worker of the northern line o was an internationalist, and who informed concerning the Petrograd events), but was able control all conversations between the Moscow reau of the Railwaymen's Executive and trograd. The control organised at the station the Northern Railway thus intercepted the egrams sent by Ryabtsev, particularly those ncerning the movement of troops, the shipment arms, etc.

In connection with the fact that Ryabtsev on tober 27th proposed that representatives of military-revolutionary committees should be at to him to discuss "modes of arming" the rkers, the struggle within the Bolshevik leadr bodies was resumed. Those workers who d been in disagreement with the decision of the scow committee, regional bureau and district mmittee, to discontinue negotiations, demanded evision of this decision. In view of these erences a joint meeting of all the available mbers of the Party centre and of the Bolshevik tion of the military-revolutionary committee s called. Here two points of view wrestled ainst each other. "By a majority of nine ainst five it was decided to reopen negotiations h Ryabtsev." (From a report by V. N. kovleva.)

In the evening of October 26th a meeting was held by the district commissars of the military-revolutionary committee to discuss the "general plan of action of the revolutionary army."

In the course of two days, on October 26th-27th, negotiations were conducted both with Rudniev, the representative of the Committee of Public Security, and Ryabtsev, the Commander of the Forces.

Rudniev and Ryabtsev deliberately dragged out these negotiations until the receipt of a telegram from headquarters and the western front stating that the troops requested by them had been sent out and that the first reinforcements from the front would arrive in Moscow on October 28th. From this moment the right-wing Socialist-Revolutionaries and the bourgeois representatives from the Committee of Public Security discontinued all talk of an agreement; an ultimatum was prepared which Ryabtsev sent to the military-revolutionary committee at 7 p.m. October 27th.

The Soviet of Officers' Deputies called a meeting of officers supporting the Provisional Government in the morning of October 27th and prepared a detailed plan of crushing the Soviets and disarming the units supporting them.

The negotiations with Ryabtsev and the instructions given in this connection to the districts (at 4 p.m. October 26th) to refrain from offensive actions could not but disorganise the districts. However, the masses of workers and soldiers, once brought into motion, continued to prepare for a decisive struggle despite instructions to desist from offensive actions.

The isolated skirmishes with *Junkers* and officers accompanied by their disarming, which began already on October 26th, continued in many places.

It was clear that the workers and soldiers were opposed to any agreements with the White Guards and *Junkers*.

During the negotiations in the Kremlin with Ryabtsev on October 27th the soldiers very nearly tore him to pieces.

V. P. Nogin who, at 7 p.m. October 27th, telephoned to the military-revolutionary committee Ryabtsev's ultimatum to dissolve and commit for trial the military-revolutionary committee threatening to start hostilities against the Soviets, strongly urged the resumption of negotiations with Ryabtsev. Simultaneously with the Ryabtsev ultimatum, the Mensheviks, the true agents of the bourgeoisie, resigned from the military-revolutionary committee. Ryabtsev's ultimatum was rejected.

At 10 p.m. October 27th, following upon Ryabtsev's ultimatum, the *Junkers* opened the offensive.

The available members of the military-revolu-

tionary committee and Party centre, at a joint conference, responded by a decision to call upon the Moscow proletariat to proclaim a general strike and rally all forces to defeat the White Guards. It was decided necessary to send V. P. Nogin, the Chairman of the Soviet, back to Petrograd.

In the morning of October 28th, Berzin, the Kremlin Commandant, deceived by Ryabtsev and the *Junkers,* after the company of the 193rd reserve regiment had been removed from the Kremlin, and the Kremlin Commissar, E. Yaroslavsky, left with it, in accordance with an agreement with the military-revolutionary committee, surrendered the Kremlin.

Ryabtsev gave Berzin 25 minutes to open the Troitsky and Borovitsky gates, leave five hostages at the gate, remove all the sentries and patrols, lay down arms and line up the 56th regiment near the monument of Alexander II., threatening otherwise to open gun-fire.

The soldiers at a meeting of the company committees responded by a rejection of this ultimatum: "We will not surrender the Kremlin, we must die anyway, let us at least die with arms in our hands." Nevertheless Berzin succeeded in persuading the soldiers to surrender their arms.

During the surrender of the Kremlin the *Junkers* simultaneously mowed down the soldiers in the Kremlin from machine-guns in two places: the soldiers of the 56th regiment near the Alexander II. monument and the soldiers of the arsenal in the arsenal yard.

This massacre of the soldiers aroused tremendous indignation among the Moscow garrison. On the same day (October 28th) a garrison meeting elected a provisional committee of soldiers' deputies of ten members to co-operate with the military-revolutionary committee.

This garrison meeting proclaimed the Socialist-Revolutionary Menshevik Executive Committee of the Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies to be a traitor to the Revolution.

On October 28th the members of the Party centre went to the different districts to inform them of the situation of the centre, which proved to be practically cut off from the districts, and to call upon them to develop a most energetic offensive from the districts in order to release the centre. On the same day the Party centre sent to the region comrades with the request for the speediest reinforcements.

On October 28th the military-revolutionary committee, the central bureau of Trade Unions, the Moscow committee of the Party and the Moscow organisation of the Social-Democracy of Poland and Lithuania issued an appeal to the workers to show "to our enemies that the overwhelming majority of the Moscow population is against them."

The Moscow proletarians enthusiastically responded to this call and all Moscow factories stopped work.

The same evening, *Skobelevskaya Ploshad* (Soviet Square now), where the Soviet was located, was being fired upon from all sides. The Soviet was surrounded by *Junkers* from *Okhotny Riad* and the side streeas entering into *Nikitskaya Street.*

The military-revolutionary committee and its staff worked out a plan for breaking through this White Guard cordon. The offensive from the Soviet developed in every direction. Barricades were erected and trenches dug around the Soviet.

On the night of October 28th a mobilisation of fighting forces was carried out in every district. On the evening of October 28th the Party centre decided to remove to *Zamoskvoretsky* district, from where it was easier to organise an offensive upon the centre in case the Soviet should be captured by the *Junkers* and to establish connections with the majority of the districts. The centre got into contact with practically every district. Demands for arms and ammunition came from every side. However, it proved to be no easy matter to obtain cartridges of the necessary make and calibre and supply them to the neighbouring districts. On October 29th a report was received by the Party centre from the military-revolutionary committee of the railwaymen's district that about 40,000 rifles had been found on the Kazan Railway. The Party centre immediately organised the distribution of the rifles to those districts which had not yet received arms.

Soon after the rifles were found, Red Guards captured the *Simonovsky* powder magazines.

Thus the districts received rifles and cartridges. Workers and soldiers began to be armed in the districts and organised into detachments.

From this moment the districts captured the initiative in the fight against the White Guards.

Already by the evening of October 28th the militant activity of the districts sharply changed the situation of the Central Soviet.

An offensive was started upon the police headquarters.

On October 29th the military-revolutionary committee opened an offensive in the centre. A detachment of cyclists consisting of 70 persons occupied the *Maly* Theatre opposite the Metropole Hotel, which was held by the *Junkers.*

The siege of the police headquarters on the Tverskoi Boulevard begun on October 28th met with tremendous difficulties because the approach to the headquarters from *Strastnaya Ploshad* was under the constant fire of the *Junkers* who occu-

ed *Nikitskie Vorota.* On October 29th the staff the military-revolutionary committee issued an der to subject the police headquarters to artil- y fire. After one direct hit the occupants rrendered the building. The chief of the tachment attacking the police headquarters, V. Sablin, continued the offensive upon *kitskie Vorota,* which was occupied in the even- g of the same day.

Bitter fighting continued for several days for e possession of the *Nikitskie Vorota.* The eds entrenched themselves in the side streets ading to the Soviet and occupied a number of uses facing *Bolshaya Nikitskaya* Street, which came the border between the Reds and the *nkers.*

In Lefortovo the majority of the cadets and nployees of the cadet buildings surrendered after severe artillery fire, while the *Junkers* and the der cadets continued to resist.

In Khamovniki the Red Guards on October th captured the quartermaster's warehouse and *atkov Lyceum,* at the corner of *Ostozhenka,* d entrenching themselves on *Krymskaya oshad* and the approaches to the *Krymsky* dge, opened an offensive against the staff of e Moscow military district along *Prechistenka* d *Ostozhenka* streets.

The Red Guards of Zamoskvoretski district, ere there was no fighting, occupied the bridges Moskva river and fought against the *Junkers* tioned on the opposite bank.

This district was of special importance in the tober days, as there were many factories in it ich served as a reservoir for the formation of d Guard detachments.

The *Sokolniki* district served as the centre for reinforcements arriving from the province, o received arms in this district. The Sokol- i tramway shops served as the place where the d Guards gathered and learned to use arms. e Red Guards of the Sokolniki district fought the city district and in the centre.

n the Krasnopresniensky district on Khodynka s located the first reserve artillery brigade, m which the military-revolutionary committee k thirteen 3in. guns in the October days. The f task of the Krasnopresniensky district was capture of the Alexandrov station with the of the military-revolutionary committee of the xandrov railway. This was accomplished hout any clashes.

he fighting conducted by the armed forces of military-revolutionary committee developed cessfully. The *Junkers* and officers surren- ed such important positions as the police head- rters and Nikitskie Vorota.

The further success of the Reds appeared to be beyond doubt.

At this moment the executive committee of the All-Russian Union of Railwaymen submitted its ultimatum for the conclusion of a truce. The Moscow military-revolutionary committee accepted the proposal for the cessation of hostilities and resumption of negotiations.

* * *

During the first three days of the struggle for the capture of power by the Soviets in Moscow (October 25th, 26th, and 27th) the leading organs of the uprising committed a number of blunders and mistakes which resulted in the protraction of the struggle.

The following are the chief of them :—

1. The Party fighting centre elected on October 25th even before the Moscow committee of the Party had learned of the capture of power by the Soviets in Petrograd, although it began to work immediately without awaiting for the election by the Plenum of the Soviets of the military-revolutionary committee, and sent out the limited Bolshevist forces to occupy the central post office, the telegraph office and the telephone exchange, nevertheless did not take sufficient measures to "form detachments of the best workers with rifles and bombs to attack and surround the enemy centres" (Lenin).

In Moscow one of the particularly important tasks of the leadership of the uprising was to arm the workers (the Red Guard for the most part had no arms) and the soldiers of the garrison. Arms were stored in the Kremlin arsenal and cartridges in the Simonovsky cartridge and powder magazines.

It turned out that, owing to the insufficient vigilance of the comrades in charge of the occupation of the post office, telegraph and telephone station, the employees of these institutions, even after their capture by the Bolshevik units, supported the counter-revolution and delivered to the city duma and the staff of the military district various telegrams, switched in the telegraph station of the staff of the district for telegraphic conversations and allowed the Committee of Public Security and its staff to conduct telephone conversations.

The leading organs of the uprising failed at first to give sufficient attention to the cartridge and dynamite magazines in *Simonovka,* while the measures to capture the Kremlin arsenal were belated and insufficiently energetic.

On the night of October 25th, as soon as the military-revolutionary committee was elected, the Party centre instructed the Bolshevik members of the committee to pass through it (the committee, it will be remembered, had some Men-

sheviks and Unionist members) a decision to appoint a commissar and commandant for the Kremlin and send army units there sympathising with the Bolsheviks. Such a decision was passed, but was carried out only in the morning of October 26th.

Meantime the *Junkers* occupied the riding school located at the Troitzky gate of the Kremlin. And when in the morning of October 26th motor trucks were sent to the Kremlin for arms, the *Junkers* detained them and posted sentries at the gates to the Kremlin.

2. The commandant and commissar of the Kremlin failed to arrest Ryabtsev and his staff officers who were in the Kremlin, to disarm the *Junkers* and officers, to take full advantage of all the possibilities for putting into fighting order the Kremlin units devoted to the Revolution (they did not appoint reliable crews for the armoured cars), to call the unarmed units of the garrison and Red Guard detachments into the Kremlin to be armed, and to take up the fight against the *Junkers* occupying the riding school; in short, they failed to do everything necessary to make the Kremlin into a citadel of the uprising.

They not only lived in peace with the White Guard staff, but even prevented the soldiers from dealing properly with Ryabtsev. These blunders led to even worse mistakes.

The "patriarchal" relations established between the Bolsheviks, the full-time workers of the Soviet, and the leaders of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries hampered the freedom of action of the fighting organs of the uprising. The representatives of the military-revolutionary committee, who for two days (October 26th-27th) conducted negotiations with Rudniev and Ryabtsev in the name of the committee, accepted Ryabtsev's promises to restore in the Kremlin the position which existed before October 25th, i.e., to withdraw the *Junkers,* provided the military-revolutionary committee withdrew the company of the 193rd regiment from the Kremlin. The revolutionary committee withdrew the company, but Ryabtsev again posted the *Junkers* around the Kremlin gates as soon as the company left the Kremlin. This mistake was followed by an even graver error. The commandant of the Kremlin surrendered the Kremlin. The White Guards received arms, including rifles, machine-guns and two armoured cars.

The White Guards repaid with treachery for the pacific policy of the commandant and commissar; they not only disarmed the soldiers but placed them under machine-gun fire.

3. The bourgeois newspapers were closed on the night of October 25, but the newspapers of the Socialist-revolutionaries, Mensheviks and other collaborationists were allowed to continue publication. These papers slandered the Bolsheviks and the workers and soldiers who had risen in revolt. They published false rumours of Bolshevik defeats in Petrograd and of victories on the part of Kerensky.

4. Two Mensheviks and one unionist had been elected to the military-revolutionary committee. This, too, was a very serious mistake. They constantly interfered with the revolutionary actions of the committee. They should not have been elected, but if after having been elected, they interfered with the struggle, they should have been removed.

5. The military-revolutionary committee made its headquarters in the building of the Soviet. The Socialist-revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who were members of the executive committees and presidiums of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies were given every opportunity to roam around the whole building, spying out what was taking place there. They reported everything taking place in the military-revolutionary committee to the committee of public security, on which they had representatives. Moreover, when the military-revolutionary committee or its staff summoned some army unit to the Soviet, the Menshevik and Socialist-revolutionary members of the Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies urged the soldiers to take no part in the "fratricidal war." All of these spies left the building of the Soviet only on October 27 after Ryabtsev has sent his ultimatum to the military-revolutionary committee. The two Menshevik members of the military-revolutionary committee also resigned then.

6. The Moscow Committee of the Party, being in disagreement with the policy of a section of the comrades who worked permanently, from the beginning of the February Revolution in the Executive Committee of the Soviets (Comrades Nogin, Ignatov, Maximov and others) kept them all out of the military-revolutionary committee. But they felt themselves in control of the Soviet (Comrade Nogin was chairman of the Soviet from the time the Bolsheviks captured the majority). The majority of the members of the military-revolutionary committee and of the Bolshevik Party centre had not worked in the Soviet before. The machinery of the Soviet was completely controlled by Comrades Nogin, Smidovich, Ignatov and others. Comrades Smidovich and Ignatov attended the meeting of the bureau of all fractions (on October 25) which passed a resolution in favour of the establishment of a "democratic power," a resolution that was subsequently rejected by the Moscow Committee and by the fraction of the Plenum of the Soviets. This group

of comrades interfered with the development of a vigorous struggle and throughout this period insisted upon negotiations with Ryabtsev and Rudniev.

7. In reply to the demand of the military-revolutionary committee, made on the morning of October 26, to allow arms to pass from the Kremlin and to return the trucks detained by the *Junkers*, Ryabtsev sent a proposal to open negotiations for the arming of the workers, etc. Instead of backing its demands by military action in the districts, the military-revolutionary committee opened negotiations, which, under the influence of V. P. Nogin, who had arrived from Petrograd on October 26, lasted for two days. But even the breaking up of these negotiations took place on the initiative of the White Guards, after they had achieved their purpose. The negotiations not only strengthened the enemy, but by spreading the illusion of the possibility of the capture of power by the Soviets without an armed struggle had a demobilising influence over the work in the districts. After Ryabtsev violated the agreement for the removal of *Junkers* from the riding school, the latter, on October 27, attacked the Dvinsk regiment and subsequently Ryabtzev advanced the most impudent ultimatum for the liquidation of the military-revolutionary committee, arrest and trial of its members (the ultimatum was rejected by the military-revolutionary committee) and, capturing the Kremlin by a trick, massacred the soldiers. V. P. Nogin, on October 28, before departing for Petrograd, attempted to again start negotiations with Ryabtsev and Rudniev.

The *Junkers* utilised the negotiations of October 26 and 27 as follow: (a) they organised themselves and surrounded the building of the Soviet on all sides; (b) they raided the company of cyclists in Petrovsky Park, where they captured machine-guns and the Simonov cartridge and powder magazines, where they seized cartridges, and the first artillery reserve brigade, where they took two 3in. guns (without locks); (c) they gained time hoping to get reinforcements.

The hesitancy of the leading organs of the uprising protracted the struggle and thereby harmed the rebellious workers and peasants.

—THE TRUCE CONCLUDED ON THE DEMAND OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE RAILWAYMEN'S UNION, AND THE UTILISATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BY THE WHITE GUARDS.

On October 29, when the strategic position of the military-revolutionary committee had greatly improved and the initiative of the offensive was captured by it, the Moscow Bureau of the Executive Committee of the Railwaymen's Union, whose representatives had "resigned" from the Committee of Public Security only owing to the insistence of the Petrograd Executive Committee of the Union, presented the military-revolutionary committee and committee of public security with the ultimatum of the executive committee of the Railwaymen's Union.

The executive committee of the Railwaymen's Union, which conceived of itself as the recognised organiser of the future government, proclaimed itself in Petrograd the head of the Ministry of Means of Communications already on October 25. On October 29 it advanced in Petrograd the categorical demand, which it circulated throughout the country "for the immediate cessation of the civil war, and uniting for the purpose of establishing a uniform revolutionary, socialist government," threatening a general railway strike and proclaiming all those "who continue the disputes to be enemies of democracy and traitors to the country and nation."

The ultimatum submitted by the executive committee of the Railwaymen's Union in Moscow contained the threat to suspend railway traffic at midnight, October 29, "unless hostilities in Petrograd and Moscow are discontinued by that time."

In Moscow the ultimatum coincided with the time when the fighting successes of the workers and soldiers definitely began to threaten the White Guard and *Junkers* with a crushing defeat. On the other hand, the public security committee received news from army headquarters on October 29 to the effect that on October 30, the day of the armistice, troops would begin to arrive in Moscow from the south-western front and that a revolt of *Junkers* was to take place in Petrograd on October 29-30.

The Moscow military-revolutionary committee agreed to negotiate. The truce was proclaimed at midnight, October 29.

The executive committee of the Railwaymen's Union appointed a concilation committee of representatives of the military-revolutionary committee, the public security committee, the Moscow Menshevik committee, the old Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies, the Soviet of the Union of Post and Telegraph Workers and the Moscow Bureau of the executive committee of Railwaymen's Union, which submitted the following draft agreement:

"1. The mixed units, both of soldiers and officers, formed specially in connection with the armed clash are to be disbanded.

"2. Both sides issue a decision to surrender arms captured for the organisation of fighting units during the period of the hostilities.

"3. A commission, consisting of an equal number of representatives of both sides and a representative of the executive committee of

Railwaymen's Union, is organised for the purpose of controlling the fulfilment of these obligations.

"4. A body uniting and directing the usual activity of all the local authorities and vested with special powers is to be created in Moscow; this body is to be in existence, pending the solution by the central government of the question of the organisation of power locally. It is to be composed of seven representatives of the city administration, seven representatives of the Moscow Soviet of Workers and Soldiers' Deputies, two representatives of the provincial *Zemstvo*, one representative each of the provincial Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies, and one representative each of the Central Council of Trade Unions, of the Post and Telegraph Workers' Union and the Railwaymen's Union. Both the military-revolutionary committee and the public security committee are to be disbanded.

"5. The provisional committee, i.e., the body provided for in clause 4, sets up a special investigation committee to inquire into the causes of the civil war in Moscow and the responsibility of individuals and organisations.

"6. Upon the conclusion of an agreement the troops of both sides are sent back to their units and placed in charge of the commander of the Moscow military district, who is to act as the representative of the provisional committee."

The military-revolutionary committee on its part submitted to the Conciliation Commission its own draft agreement in the following terms:

1. All power in Moscow is in the hands of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies.

2. The mixed units, both of officers and soldiers are disbanded.

3. The Red Guard is not abolished, in the interests of the defence of the Revolution. The White Guards are abolished. Surplus arms to be returned to the arsenal.

4. Upon the conclusion of an agreement the troops of both sides are to be returned to their units.

The commission rejected the draft agreement submitted by the military-revolutionary committee and made the draft agreement submitted by the Railwaymen's Union a basis for the discussion. The representatives of the military-revolutionary committee on this conciliation committee—P. G. Smidovich, P. E. Kushner and N. I. Muralov—accepted three clauses of the Railwaymen's draft (1, 3 and 6), and after an ultimatum from the Railwaymen's Union, clause 4, as relating to the composition of the government.

The discussion of the question of an agreement was not completed, however, and the conciliation committee decided to prolong the armistice for another twelve hours.

The Moscow military-revolutionary committee rejected the prolongation of the armistice, refused to agree to the draft agreement of the Railwaymen's Union, and sharp at midnight resumed the hostilities on all the fighting fronts.

The position of the representatives of the military-revolutionary committee — Smidovich, Kushner and Muralov—at the conciliation committee of the Railwaymen's Union caused the Party fighting centre to resolutely raise the question of those members of the military-revolutionary committee who had not been elected by the Soviets, and had been co-opted to the committee without agreement of the Party centre.

During the discussion of this question the Party centre submitted to the military-revolutionary committee the demand to exclude those Bolsheviks who had been co-opted without the knowledge of the Party centre, and proved to be in too pacific sentiments (Smidovich, Kushner, Roseholz and others).

The truce proclaimed at midnight of October 30 was actually broken by the White Guards, which made it necessary for the Red Guards to continue the fighting.

Thus, the object of the ultimatum of the Railwaymen's Union became clear to all: under cover of negotiations to betray the vigilance of the Moscow workers and soldiers, in order to bring reinforcements, occupy positions of advantage and deal a decisive blow at the Moscow proletariat.

The attempt of the Whites was not crowned with success. The relentless vigilance and revolutionary initiative of the masses of workers and soldiers smashed the plans of the counter-revolution. At the same time the exposure of the treacherous designs of the collaborationists forced the followers of a "bloodless" completion of the uprising on the military-revolutionary committee to remain silent, and limit themselves subsequently to opposing the extensive use of artillery.

The violation of the truce by the White Guard aroused indignation in the province as well, and many Red Guard and soldier detachments began to arrive in Moscow daily in aid of the Moscow proletariat and garrison.

The treachery of the Whites put an end to all talk of the possibility and desirability of continuing the truce for the purpose of concluding an agreement between the military-revolutionary committee and the public security committee.

—PROGRESS OF HOSTILITIES AFTER THE TRUCE ND THE CAPITULATION OF THE WHITE GUARD STAFF.

By order of the staff of the military-revolution-y committee hostilities were resumed after the ruce" (which did not actually take place) by e opening of artillery fire at midnight of ctober 31.

On November 1, Red Guard detachments gan to fire upon the telephone exchange from gun placed on a belfry. The *Junkers* put out a hite flag. G. A. Ussievich, who took a most tive part in this siege, issued the demand for conditional surrender, guaranteeing the emies' personal safety. Ten minutes later the *nkers* and officers began to come out and lay wn their arms.

The same morning a conference of representa-es of district staffs was held, under the chair-nship of I. N. Stukov. This conference decided resort in the struggle with the *Junkers* to all hnical weapons, including guns and airplanes, l to start a determined offensive against the y Duma and the Kremlin.

On this day the hostilities developed splendidly. The general situation towards the end of the was as follows: The offensive of the Red ards upon the Red Square and the City Duma s continued and the Duma was cleared of the *nkers* at 3 a.m. November 2, while they still nained in the Kremlin and in the Riding School. e *Junkers* held one side of Nikitskaya street, kitsky Boulevard and Arbat; Prechistenka and ozhenka streets, where they had the district ff, were occupied from the Cathedral of the viour. Zamoskvoretzky district frustrated the empts of the *Junkers* to break through to the er side of the river. The Red Guards advanc- by the side streets from Povarskaya and chistenka streets, attempted to capture at least mall section of Arbat in order to cut off the mmunications between the Alexander Military ool and the Fifth Officers' School.

On the night of November 2 negotiations were med, this time for the surrender of the *kers*.

At 10.55 a.m. the Metropole Hotel was cleared the *Junkers*. At the same time the forces ancing upon Chinatown occupied the whole of na-town. About 200 Red Guards, who had n kept prisoners at the Metropole, were ased. With the capture of the Metropole, the *notny Riad* detachments occupied the City na and the Historical Museum, from where *Junkers* and the public security committee had eated to the Kremlin at 3 a.m., apparently er the pressure of the artillery attack upon the na.

Upon the capture of the Metropole by us, the *Junkers* subjected it to machine-gun fire from the Kremlin. They also fired upon Okhotny Riad from the Kremlin tower. To stop the machine-gun fire the gun stationed on Lubianskaya Ploshchad began to fire upon the Spasskaya tower of the Kremlin. Simultaneously gun-fire began to be directed at the tower from Mastiazhart works on Shvivaya Gorka, and after the Kremlin clock had been smashed the machine-gun was silenced.

At 2.37 p.m. the Kremlin had been surrounded by the Soviet troops. Artillery fire was directed against the Nikolskay gate.

Simultaneously with the attack upon the City Duma, a detachment of Red Guards and Dvinsk regiment soldiers attacked the old University building and occupied it.

By 7 p.m. all of Chinatown had been occupied by us. The *Verkhnie Torgovye Riady*, historical museum and city duma had also been occupied.

From *Kudrino* the Red Guards successfully advanced along *Povarskaya* and *Bronnaya* streets towards *Nikitskie Vorota*.

In the *Khamovniki* district the *Junkers* attempted to break through to Briansk station, but met with powerful resistance. The artillery in Khamovniki continued to fire upon the fifth officers' school.

Zamoskvoretsky district started an offensive along Kamenny Most (Stone Bridge) and drove out the *Junkers*. The Red Guards from Ostozhenka captured the staff of the district, and from Zamoskvorechye drove the *Junkers* out of the Cathedral of the Saviour. The *Junkers* escaped to Alexander School and attempted from there to make their way towards the Briansk station.

That negotiations for the surrender of the *Junkers* were being conducted was known to the district, but the masses, taught by the lesson of the truce of October 29-30, no longer believed in the sincerity of the Whites.

The agreement for the surrender of the Whites was signed at 5 p.m. and the military-revolutionary committee issued an order to discontinue hostilities at 9 p.m. November 2.

Nevertheless, skirmishes continued here and there during November 3 as well. For this reason, the staff of the military-revolutionary committee issued an order to the detachments operating on Ostozhenka and Prechistenka streets, stating:

> "In case of hostilities on the part of the enemy the detachment must take all measures and open peace negotiations with them, but should it prove to be impossible to start peace negotiations or should the enemy continue his

offensive after the negotiations, all military action should be taken to repulse the enemy."

At 10.35 a.m. November 3, the Smolensky market was completely in the hands of the Red Guards; ambushes were established here in order to interfere with the movement of the *Junkers*, who attempted, after the signing of the surrender agreement, to flee from Moscow towards the Briansk station. The section from the Borodinsky Bridge, from the corner of Protochny pereulok and Novinsky Boulevard, Smolenskaya street, and the embankment of the Moskva river, had been held by the *Junkers* of the 5th Officers' School at the time of their surrender. The Left Socialist-revolutionary, who was working in the staff of the military-revolutionary committee, Lieutenant A. Vladimirsky, at the head of a detachment of Dvinsk regiment soldiers, issued forth into this district for the purpose of reconnaissance and placed two guns at Briansk station.

In the morning of November 3 the 5th Officers' School surrendered.

At 4 p.m. the Alexander Military School began to be disarmed.

The Kremlin was occupied by the Red Guards after the cessation of the artillery fire at 3 a.m. November 3. Before that time only individual Red Guards had penetrated into the Kremlin. They found the soldiers, headed by Berzin, kept as war prisoners, and the *Junkers* of the 1st Officers' School, who had refused to march upon Alexander School, and declared that they had not participated in the fighting, but merely did guard duty. The *Junkers* who had taken an active part in the fighting, left the Kremlin after the surrender order and went to Alexander Military School, while some of them managed to make their way into private houses.

The situation of the public security committee and its staff became hopeless. Among the *Junkers* a definite split had occurred. A similar split took place in the staff of the White Guards themselves, some of whom accused Ryabtsev of half-heartedness and a tendency to co-operate with the Soviets.

The Minister of Food, S. N. Prokopovich, who took an active part in the public security committee, sought to get an appointment with General Brussilov, desiring to proclaim him as military dictator. On the other hand, a section of the *Junkers* began to realise that the public security committee had betrayed them.

The demoralisation which set in, both among the commanding officers and among the rank and file of the White *Junkers*, also affected the public security committee in the adoption of its decision to capitulate. The determined offensive of the Reds and the artillery attack upon the *Junkers'* strongholds further intensified this demoralisation.

At 6 a.m. November 2, Rudniev sent to the military revolutionary committee his letter for capitulation, in which the public security committee stated that:

"Under the given conditions it considers it necessary to discontinue in Moscow the armed struggle against the political system practised by the military-revolutionary committee, passing to political methods of struggle and leaving to the future the solution on a national scale of the question of the structure of power in the centre and locally."

At 7 a.m. November 2 a delegation of six "socialist parties," headed by S. Volsky, came to the military-revolutionary committee during the discussion of the conditions for the surrender and disarming of the *Junkers*. This delegation exercised powerful pressure upon the members of the military-revolutionary committee, seeking to mitigate the conditions of surrender. Under its pressure the following agreement was adopted:

1. The public safety committee discontinues its existence.

2. The White Guards return their arms and are disbanded. The officers retain the arms due to their rank. The *Junker* schools retain only arms necessary for training. All other arms must be returned by the *Junkers*. The military-revolutionary committee guarantees them personal freedom and safety.

3. For the solution of the question of the means by which the disarming mentioned in clause 2 was to be carried out a commission is formed of representatives of military-revolutionary committee, of the commanding officers and of the organisations which took part in the mediation efforts.

4. From time of the signing of the peace treaty, both parties immediately issue an order for the cessation of all firing and other hostilities and take determined measures to enforce these orders.

5. Upon the signing of the agreement all war prisoners of both sides are immediately released.

When P. G. Smidovich and V. M. Smirnov acquainted the military-revolutionary committee with the final text of the agreement, a majority of the members of the Party centre and those members of the military-revolutionary committee who had been absent at the morning meeting were present. The agreement aroused sharp opposition and might not have been approved had not V. M. Smirnov declared that in case of its rejection he, as an army officer who had signed the

greement, would have to place himself at the isposal of the public security committee.

The workers and soldiers who took part in the attles of November 2 and 3 immediately cor-ected the leniency of the leading organs of the prising: not only were the officers not allowed o retain arms "due to their rank," but in many ases the officers and *Junkers* had to be dressed n soldiers' uniforms to protect them against the nasses. Many of them had to be sent to jail to e released from there on the basis of the agree-ient. The *Junker* schools were no longer allowed o function.

The mere fact that the capitulation of the ounter-revolution assumed the form of a treaty oncluded between two equal parties as it were, ather than the form of conditions of surrender, roused protests and perplexity among the Ioscow workers and soldiers.

When, in the evening, members of the military-evolutionary committee and party centre visited ie district party centres and military-revolution-ry committees, they found that the report of the eaty for the surrender of the *Junkers*, and con-tions of this surrender was received not only ithout enthusiasm, but with definite hostility, specially in those districts which bore the brunt the fighting. Nevertheless, the treaty was rried out by the districts, even though their dis-ntent with its conditions did not weaken.

Furthermore, the decision to leave arms to the ficers, the total impunity of the counter-revolu-onaries as expressed in the guarantee of their eedom and personal safety and the clause pro-ding for the immediate release of all imprisoned *unkers* and White Guards, aroused general in-gnation. This discontent found its expression the speeches of representatives of the district ilitary-revolutionary committees at a conference eld between them and the military-revolutionary ommittee on November 3, and the resolutions nd decisions of the general meetings of the orkers and soldiers.

The representatives of the district military-volutionary committees demanded the annul-ent of the treaty, the imprisonment of the *unkers* and White Guards, and the death penalty r the leaders of the counter-revolution.

The leaders of the public security committee roceeded to organise sabotage in every institu-n of Moscow: their specialists, the army fficers, began to enroll recruits into the counter-volutionary "volunteer" army and despatch White Guards to the Don, where Kaledin was rming his bands. The bulk of the officers and nkers, who had fought against the workers and ldiers in Moscow, went to fill the ranks of the counter-revolution organised on the Don and in the Ukraine.

The humanity displayed by the Petrograd and Moscow revolutionary committees towards the clear-cut class enemies (the release of the "socialist" ministers in Petrograd, who immediately went to Moscow to organise a provisional government, the release of General Krassnov, against his word of honour, the impunity accorded to the officers and *Junkers*, despite the fact that they had murdered and executed the imprisoned revolutionaries), proved to be only harmful to the proletarian revolution.

The victorious proletarian dictatorship at first treated its enemies with too much leniency. The class enemy, who began the struggle against the Soviet power, forced the Bolsheviks to attack him with fire and sword.

After the victory over the White Guards and establishment of Soviet power in Petrograd and Moscow, the Moscow revolutionary committee issued the following manifesto:

"TO ALL MOSCOW CITIZENS.

"Comrades and Citizens,

"After five days of bloody battles the enemies of the people who raised an armed hand against the revolution have been completely routed. They have surrendered and have been disarmed. At the price of the blood of the valiant fighters, the soldiers and workers, victory has been gained. Henceforth a people's government, the power of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies will be established in Moscow.

"The Moscow victory consolidates the world historical victory of the Petrograd proletariat and garrison. Amidst the roaring of the world war the central state power in the capital of Russia has passed into the hands of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets. This is the power of the people itself, of workers, soldiers, peasants. This is a power of peace and freedom, it is a power which has offered peace, transferred the land to the peasants, abolished capital punishment which had been introduced by the traitor to the Revolution, Kerensky. The supreme representative body of the entire Russian democracy has appointed it. Anyone who will raise an armed hand against it will be swept away by the revolutionary people.

"The Moscow bourgeoisie, by the machine-guns of the *Junkers* and revolvers of the White Guards, proclaimed an uprising against the people's government. They wanted again to return the land to the landlords, to restore capital punishment, to delay the peace.

"The tremendous heroism of the soldiers and

Red worker guards saved the Revolution.

"Having broken the resistance of the enemy the military-revolutionary committee declares, in the name of the workers and soldiers:

"All measures will be taken to restore the normal life of the city. The factories and mills will be started on an order of the committee. The banks, offices and stores will open on its directions. Everything will be done to assure food for the city. The violators of revolutionary order, robbers, plunderers, marauders, alcohol vendors, will be tried by a merciless tribunal.

"Comrades and citizens,

"The whole world is going through a colossal crisis, the war provoked by capital has led to a deep upheaval and stirred the working masses in every country. The proletarian revolution is growing everywhere. To the Russian working class has fallen the great honour to be the first to overthrow the rule of the bourgeoisie. For the first time in the history of humanity the toiling classes have taken power into their own hands, having captured freedom by their own blood. This freedom they will not let go from their hands. The armed people stands guard of the revolution.

"Glory to those who have fallen in the great struggle!

"May their cause become the cause of the living!

"The military-revolutionary committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies."

The land of the Soviets has put into operation the factories and mills, as was promised by the military-revolutionary committee in its manifesto. It has consolidated and widened the gains of the October Revolution.

CONCLUSION.

1. The October uprising in Moscow was a true people's uprising. Despite the tardiness and sometimes hesitancy of the leading organs of the uprising the greatest masses of workers and soldiers rallied to the armed struggle. The factories and mills were the strongholds of this uprising. The workers gave the best fighters, supplied arms and everything for the victory. By their revolutionary enthusiasm and class-consciousness they exercised a powerful influence over the soldier masses, carrying them into the struggle and leading them. The working masses and part of the garrison spurred the district revolutionary centres on to offensive actions, to a spirit of irreconcilability, steadfastness and determination, during the uprising. The district centres in turn insisted upon the taking up of offensive tactics by the central leading organs of the uprising. Thanks to the revolutionary creative spirit and heroic determination of the vanguard workers many of the mistakes committed by the central leadership were corrected in the districts. Thanks to the self-sacrifice of the masses victory was achieved.

2. In Moscow, as in Petrograd, the organisation in charge of the uprising was completely controlled by a single party, the party of the Bolsheviks. The fact that in Moscow, during the first days of the uprising, representatives of the collaborationist parties entered the military-revolutionary committee to sabotage it, clearly revealed to the great masses that at all the stages of the armed struggle they were mortal enemies of the uprising, agents and spies of the counter-revolution. When the victory inclined towards the Bolsheviks, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, directly or through the so-called "International Wing" of the revolutionary parties (Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, Social-Democrats, United Internationalists and other "Left" parties), exercised pressure upon the military-revolutionary committee, prompting it first towards negotiations with the White Guard staff and then towards mitigation of the conditions of surrender of the White Guards. If the social collaborationists failed to protract the uprising still further, and mitigate the conditions of surrender even more, it was only because, during the period of preparations, the Bolsheviks had already succeeded in isolating these parties from the masses while in the process of the armed struggle the masses completely turned away from them.

3. In Moscow, no less than in Petrograd, the true inspirer of the uprising was Lenin, who was faithfully and unhesitatingly followed by the great majority of the central committee of the Party. Vladimir Ilyich's letter on the possibility and necessity of an uprising, declaring that "to wait is a crime against the Revolution," were naturally of tremendous importance to the whole Party, to the whole proletariat, to all the toilers of Russia. To Moscow these directions were of the more decisive importance, since these letters, which were addressed directly to the Moscow Committee, strongly emphasised the rôle and duties of Moscow in the uprising. Lenin's letters gave the decisive impetus to the activists of the Moscow organisation to discuss the question of preparations of an uprising, not only within the narrow circle of the leadership, but also to reorganise the entire work of the Moscow organisation for the purpose of immediate preparation of the uprising. If we disregard the proposal of the leading workers from the regional bureau made on July 4th to occupy the post-office, telegraph office, *Russkoye Slovo* (which meant the beginning of

armed uprising in Moscow), nobody before in's letter ("The Bolsheviks must seize power September 12th-14th") raised the question of "possibility that even Moscow must begin." the other hand, in Moscow, thanks to the nority enjoyed by Comrades Rykov and gin in the fraction of the executive committees he soviets right up to the very uprising and ng it, the Kamenev-Zinoviev tendency which osed the uprising, although without coming in the open, retained its influence. It was pre- ly under the influence of Lenin's letters and central committee's decisions that the Moscow sheviks realised and firmly decided that scow can and must come out in support of rograd. The Moscow proletariat fulfilled this sion.

At the same time the serious mistakes com- ed in Moscow during the October days by the ership of the uprising were a result of the that "the chief rules of the art of revolution" h Lenin constantly stressed in his letters, e violated by the central fighting organs in scow both during the organisation of the upris- and particularly during the leadership of the ed struggle itself. As if foreseeing the pos- ity of such mistakes, Lenin reminded the covites in his letters that "an armed uprising *special* type of political struggle subject to ial laws which must be carefully considered." mistakes committed during the October days Moscow were a result of the fact that even the rity of the leading Moscow comrades who ly followed Lenin, did not give sufficient ght to the special laws of the organisation of rmed uprising which the great leader of the ber victory stressed in his letters.

contrast to Petrograd, where the counter- lutionary uprising of the *Junkers* was imme- ly and mercilessly suppressed in one night, leadership of the armed uprising in Moscow layed tardiness and hesitation which resulted he protraction of the struggle against the teguards. Conrary to Lenin's instructions: gin it (the uprising) in the firm knowledge you must *go on to the end,*" the Moscow lheviks, already during the organisation of eading organs of the uprising committed mis- s which interfered with the speedy bringing e uprising to a victorious conclusion. Among mistakes of the organisation of the uprising the following:—

(a) The fighting organs were created late;

(b) the military-revolutionary committee had among its members Mensheviks and a Unionist (four Bolsheviks, two Mensheviks and one Unionist);

(c) in the military-revolutionary committees, both in the centre and in the districts, there were no comrades, at the beginning of the hostilities, who really knew military matters. The fact that the leadership of the uprising failed to assure the immediate and lasting capture of the arsenal and powder magazines so as to arm workers and soldiers was due solely to the military-technical weakness of the military-revolutionary committee;

(d) being insufficiently equipped in its composition, the military-revolutionary committee proved to be even weaker owing to co-optation of a number of comrades. According to a resolution adopted by the Plenum of the joint Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies on October 25th, the military-revolutionary committee had the right of co-optation. But the point was that a large part of the co-opted members did not help to exhibit the necessary energy, speed and determination, that "art and treble daring" which are necessary for the speedy success of an uprising.

5. "Once an uprising is started it is necessary to act with the greatest *determination* and by all means to take up the *offensive.*" "The defensive is death to an armed uprising."

Had the Moscow Bolsheviks carried into effect this Marxian law of armed uprising, they, with the overwhelming majority of the workers, and active support of a large section of the garrison and sympathy of its vast majority on their side already at the beginning of the uprising, should have quickly brought to the most important points, in accordance with a previously prepared plan, the most reliable detachments in order to surround the enemy and to force him to surrender, perhaps even without a battle. But some members of the military-revolutionary committee, even after the beginning of the uprising, continued to cherish the hope of the capture of power by the Soviets, not through a struggle, but through repeated negotiations with the class enemy. As a matter of fact, it was only the enemy who utilised these negotiations. He gained time to organise his forces. He succeeded in securing the surrender of the Kremlin by deception, in surrounding the building of the Soviet and submitted an ultimatum to the military-revolutionary committee. Had the counter-revolution—the bourgeoisie, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks — possessed in Moscow any important military units whom the *Junkers* and officers could have led against the Soviet, October 28th might have become a critical day for the uprising. The capture of the Soviet might either have rendered a victory over the enemy more difficult for the districts, or have led to even graver consequences.

The success of the Moscow uprising, despite the fact that the central leadership at certain moments adopted a defensive policy, does not lessen the gravity of this mistake, or weaken the truth of the maxim that "the defensive is death to an armed uprising." This lesson must be learned by the revolutionary proletariat of all countries. In starting an uprising it is wrong to proceed from the hope that such a favourable situation will develop as was the case in the October days in Moscow when the White Guard officers did not have a single reliable military unit, when they even made no attempt to lead the soldiers against the insurgents, and when the social collaborationists were therefore forced to limit themselves to persuading the soldiers to preserve neutrality in the struggle.

By October 29th, thanks to the determined actions of the military-revolutionary committee of the centre, the energy of the districts and revolutionary units of the garrison, the situation greatly improved. The success achieved might have led to complete victory by October 31st had it been continued without hesitation. But the military-revolutionary committee, instead of seeking to achieve daily and hourly even small successes, agreed to a 24-hour truce. True, on the night of October 30th the military-revolutionary committee rejected the decision of the conciliation commission of the executive committee of the Railwaymen's Union to prolong the truce for another twelve hours, as well as the decision for an agreement itself. But the time for the development of the offensive during these 24 hours had been lost. The military-revolutionary committee might have conducted negotiations for the surrender of the White Guards, of course, without, however, discontinuing the struggle, as was done on November 2nd.

6. The fact that the Party centre was forced to vacate the building of the Soviet at the very beginning of the uprising played no small part in the hesitation displayed by the military-revolutionary committee. Under the fighting conditions which developed on October 27th, the decision of the Party centre and Bolshevist section of the military-revolutionary committee to create two centres of the uprising was inevitable. The military-revolutionary committee might have been cut off and even captured by the White Guards, and it was therefore necessary to create a second central organ to lead the districts as the districts alone could have, and actually saved the centre by their fighting actions. Although the Party centre was in constant contact with the military-revolutionary committee (by constant visits to the Soviet by members of the Party centre in *Zamoskovrechye* and by telephone conversations as a last resort), yet this contact was insufficient. From the early morning of October 28th until the night of November 1st, there were no joint meetings between the Party centre as a whole and the military-revolutionary committee. This could not but contribute towards the many mistakes committed by the military-revolutionary committee and influence the selection of the comrades co-opted by the committee.

"The success of both the Russian and the world revolution depends upon two-three days of fighting," wrote Lenin, urging the Bolsheviks of Petrograd and Moscow to resolutely and firmly carry out the uprising. History has confirmed these words.

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THE MOBILISATION OF THE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY FORCES AND THE GROWTH OF THE FORCES OF REVOLUTION IN JAPAN.

AS always, in periods immediately preceding big class conflicts, there is at present taking ace in Japan simultaneously a growth of the rces of revolution, and a mobilisation of the rces of counter-revolution.

The régime of fascist reaction grows ever more utal. The mobilisation of the counter-revolunary forces is led by the military, with General aki at their head. Its basic aim is counter-volutionary war against the U.S.S.R. and still eater suppression of the toiling masses of Japan elf. The entire domestic and foreign policy of e country is subordinated to this aim.

I.—THE ECONOMIC SITUATION.

A great new military programme is being alised, straining all the resources of the country the utmost. The entire Japanese army is being -armed at a forced speed; it is being equipped d enriched with the newest military technique. ere is going on an accelerated accumulation of w military reserves, and a feverish construction the military strategic Manchuria-Korea rail-ad.

The realisation of this great military pro-amme was the main cause of the growth of dustrial production in the country, which began the second half of 1932 and lasted until quite cently. Simultaneously, there was a growth rough a widening of the world market. It grew ring a contraction of the world market, by cing out the goods of other countries—pecially English textiles.

This growth of industrial production was made ssible by the following basic facts. *In the first ace,* the Japanese workers receive colonial low ages for European high productivity of labour. is sufficient to say that at a time when the eekly wage of a spinner in the U.S. is equiva-t to 35 yen, in England to 18 yen, and in India 5.0 yen—then, in Japan, it amounts to only 3 yen. The wage percentage for a bale of yarn Japan is not only one quarter as much as in nerica, but only two-fifths as much as in India.

During the crisis, and especially in the last ar, the Japanese bourgeoisie—supported by the narchist apparatus of coercion—has opened up even greater offensive against the Japanese oletariat, along two lines: the line of the rkers' wages, which are even without that on olonial low level; and the line of further intensification of labour. The intensification of labour has attained monstrous dimensions. Thus, for instance, if 30 working spindles were assigned to one worker in 1922, and 48 in 1929—then in 1932, 60 were assigned. The number of working spindles in 1932 as compared with 1927 increased from 4,900,000 to 7,100,000; while the number of workers in the spinning industry decreased during the same period from 170,000 to 130,000. The same thing happened in the weaving industry. While there were certain increases in looms in nine of the largest companies, the number of workers as compared with 1928 was cut down by a whole quarter—from 44,000 to 33,000. At the same time production in these companies for the first half of 1933 amounted to 827 million yards, as compared with 668 million yards for the same half of 1928. Simultaneously, the wage level has been and is being lowered.

Further, according to official data, the actual wage which reached the highest point of 92.1 in December, 1932, has systematically fallen month by month to 88.1 in May, 1933. At the same time with the increase in prices during the year from July, 1932, to July, 1933, real wages have shrunk approximately 15 per cent.

One of the most savage forms of attack on the working class is the *system of temporary workers,* which is being adopted to an ever wider extent. Temporary workers are employed not directly for the manufacturer, but for the contractor. They get especially low wages. Their working day is not less than 14 hours in the 24. These temporary workers get no notice when they are discharged. After they have worked for a very short time, such workers are thrown out into the streets, and are replaced by fresh workers.

In the second place, the growth of industrial production is forced by the lowering of the rate of exchange of the yen. Japan entered upon the depreciation of her currency earlier and more boldly than other countries. *The yen has fallen more than 50 per cent., and, up to the present, its rate of exchange stands much lower than those of the pound and dollar, which have fallen considerably.*

In the third place, this pseudo-economic rise takes place at the cost of an inflation of the credit system. Despite the considerable growth of Japanese export, and her favourable balance of trade, the deficit in the government budget in

1932 amounted to not less than half the total budget. This deficit was covered entirely through internal loans, which were issued to the sum of one billion yen in 1932-33, and will be issued in the current budget year to the sum of about one and a half billion yen.

All the weakness of Japan's financial system is exposed with particular clearness by the fact that the new loans, issued during the past year, were not realised on the market, but were distributed obligatorially among the banks and savings banks. The money from all these loans goes entirely to military expenses.

The shaky and limited character of all this growth of industrial production is obvious. In the first place, it is confined to the limits of the war and export industries. In the second place, the internal market continues to shrink. There is a fall, not only in the internal consumption of industrial goods, but also in the consumption of the basic food product—rice. The consumption of rice has decreased during the year from 110 sho to 100.6 sho of rice per person.

The data for May-June, 1933, reveals to what extent the "revival" of Japanese industry depends on export, and how sensitive Japan is to the blows of the economic war which is developing between herself and England. The export of Japanese textiles still continued to grow during these mouths; but the proximity of the introduction of prohibitive tariffs in India and in other colonies has already had the effect that, notwithstanding the growth of export, the production of the export industries has begun to decrease. This extreme dependence of Japan on export must inevitably lead to the utmost sharpness of her economic struggle with other countries, in particular with England.

In the fourth place, the agrarian crisis continues to deepen. After a temporary rise, the price of rice is again falling sharply; and it will inevitably fall further. At the same time the prices of fertilisers, which play a large part in the expenses of the Japanese peasant, have gone up unusually—in some products as high as 70-120 per cent.

In the rural districts a new wave of mass ruination is coming on. The attack of the landowners on the peasants is being intensified along all lines. The peasants are being driven away from the land to an ever greater extent. The ruling classes reckon on maintaining their position for some time yet, both in the field of export and in that of finance. The most aggressive elements leading the military reckon on forestalling the obvious danger of a crash by the beginning of a great new war.

In this manner, the military-inflationary growth of industrial production in Japan goes on through the robbery of the masses. It is a factor which deepens the world economic crisis, and at the same time brings the country nearer to a financial crisis.

2.—THE PREPARATION OF COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY WAR AGAINST THE U.S.S.R.

In these circumstances the propaganda of chauvinism and of militant imperialism has assumed unheard-of dimensions. All forces of the government apparatus are thrown into the business of chauvinistic propaganda; also, all forces of the mass patriotic organisations, created by the government apparatus for propagandising imperialistic nationalism — in the manner of Goebbels' ministry of fascist propaganda in Germany. All the achievements of contemporary agitational technique—radio, cinema, the Press, mass propaganda literature, military parades and manoeuvres—are mobilised completely to propagandise chauvinism and war. Desperate attempts are being made to form chauvinistic organisations among the workers, and to form nuclei of the military-patriotic organisations in the shops and factories.

A whole arsenal of lying arguments is used for this chauvinistic propaganda: that Japan is overpopulated; that it is impossible to get out of the crisis without the formation of an Asiatic economic bloc, "with Japan as centre"—that is, under her domination; that Japan cannot exist without Manchou Ko—Japan's "life-line"; agitation for Japan's "great" mission—to "free" the Asiatic people, oppressed by the white races, etc., etc. All these "ideals" are propagated by all groups —by the military, the old bourgeois parties, the fascists, and the social-democrats. The difference between them lies only in their disguises, in their phraseology: that which one group calls the interests of "Japan," i.e., of Japanese imperialism, is called by the others the interests of the proletariat. That which Araki calls Japanism is called by the base renegades Sano and Nabayama —socialism; and by Akamatsu and Co.—state socialism, national socialism. That which Araki calls the national mission, Sano and the social-democrats call "internationalism," etc., etc. Both groups speak of a war for "national liberation." Araki proves its necessity by "imperial ethics," while Sano and the social-democrats prove it by "proletarian justice"; but both groups try to bring this war under the category of wars "in the name of progress."

All the chauvinistic propaganda, and all its arguments, are concentrated around the official slogan put forward by the government — "Hidzedsi," which means literally, "a critical

iod." This slogan has always been advanced the past on the eve of wars or in times of ional distress. Now, this slogan takes on the aning that the other countries will not allow an to escape from the crisis and are going to ry on war against Japan, with the aim of troying her. This slogan, like all the chauistic propaganda, puts the question thus: that an has no choice — she must either fight or ish. The significance of this slogan is that it kes it possible to carry on an ideological preation for a new plundering, robbing war under retence of defence.

apanese imperialism wants to exploit the basic temporary contradiction — the contradiction ween the world of socialism and the world of italism—for the purpose of attaining a different elation of forces, which would enable her to e dominion over the peoples of Asia. In a ory over the U.S.S.R. Japan sees the easiest y of gaining hegemony in Asia, and crushing revolution in China and the entire Orient—in er later, on this basis, to enter into a decisive flict with the most powerful imperialist coun-s. But, which is most important, Japanese tarism cannot realise its bloody plans—a series wars against the big imperialist countries — hout first, as a preliminary, crushing the grow- revolutionary movement inside the country. was not able to attain this end through its cessful war against China, or through terror hin the country. It reckons on attaining both s—the suppression of the revolutionary move-t inside the country, and the change in the elation of its forces with the forces of the U.S. rough a war against the U.S.S.R. Precisely this reason, the Japanese monarchy is deter-ed to carry on a counter-revolutionary war inst the U.S.S.R. before anything else, and he very near future. The unity of the Japanese narchy's policies of war and of counter-revolu- finds its fullest expression in these plans; war against the U.S.S.R. is, in all its pur-es, a direct civil war of the Japanese bour-isie and landowners against the Japanese kers and peasants, and is an attempt to trans-n the Japanese people into a shock detachment he international counter-revolution.

apanese imperialism has long been the chief *darme* of the Far East, the main stronghold the counter-revolution against the liberation vement of the Eastern colonial peoples. At sent it has, in addition, become a stronghold the entire international counter-revolution, the vanguard of this counter-revolution in the ggle against the U.S.S.R. and the entire inter-onal proletariat. It contends with German fascism for first place in the camp of the inciters of counter-revolutionary war against the U.S.S.R. The readiness of Japanese imperialism to be the first to attack the U.S.S.R. is already now being used by the English die-hards in an attempt to secure solidarity among the Western imperialists —who are on the verge of fighting among themselves — in an interventionist bloc against the U.S.S.R. The entire internal and foreign policy of imperialist Japan is at present subordinated to the task of the most speedy organisation of a counter-revolutionary war against the U.S.S.R. The Japanese politicians operate their plans—first of all, to carry on a war against the U.S.S.R.—and are guided by them, in their negotiations with other imperialist countries, in particular with the U.S. (Baron Isshii's mission, the preparation of a military union with German fascism.) The Pekin armistice, likewise, is an agreement between Japanese imperialism and the counter-revolutionary Kuomintang against the U.S.S.R. and Soviet China; and it was arrived at with the active participation of English imperialism. The declaration of the dominating clique of Araki and others, in its openly anti-Soviet character, in no way abates from—and even outdoes—Hugenberg's memorandum at the international economic conference.

Japanese imperialism's grandiose military preparations are directed basically against the U.S.S.R. Straining the resources of the country to limits threatening an inevitable financial crash in case the war is delayed for any protracted period,—the monarchistic government is carrying on, at a furious speed, the re-arming of its land forces; this is indisputably directed exclusively against the U.S.S.R. Feverish construction of strategic railroads is going on in Manchuria and Korea; these railroads are necessary only for war against the U.S.S.R. Troops are being transferred uninterruptedly and with unremitting speed into Manchuria—that is, on to the anti-Soviet parade ground. The industry and the entire economy of the country are being put on a war footing. Take, for instance, such a group of measures as: the subordination of branches of industry to the Ministry of War; the enormous size of the war orders; the test mobilisations of all industry; the rice law, which gives the government the actual right to a monopoly on rice in case of war; the promotion of metallurgy, of the chemical, aviation, and armoured-tank industries, and of other war industries and industries connected with war, etc., etc.

A most important composite part of the frantic preparation for war is the extreme intensification of the repression of the Communist Party.

3.—THE REGIME OF FASCIST REACTION IN THE COUNTRY.

During the last year, police terror has assumed unparalleled dimensions. In 1932 over 7,000 people were arrested for revolutionary activity. In the first nine months of 1933, we know of the assassination of three prominent revolutionists, including the great proletarian writer Kabaji, who was killed in the police station; 80 were wounded, and 7,169 arrested. A system of arrest on the least suspicion has been introduced. The bourgeois newspapers report that in the prefecture of Kioto alone, 34,700 people were arrested in one year; that makes up about 10 per cent. of the entire adult population. Last year fingerprints were taken only in the Kioto police station, and only of 1,800 people; this year, fingerprints are taken of all people newly entering the factories, the educational institutions, etc. A new fascist law has been worked out, which is being put into action even before its adoption. Its substance is the legalisation of an even greater degree of police arbitrariness in the struggle against the revolutionary movement. Thus, if up to now the police have had the right to keep people in confinement, without trial and verdict, for not over a month—then the new law abolishes this restriction. If, up to now, the records of testimony given at the police station could be refuted at the trial—*now it is proposed that all testimony given by the defendants, which they usually give to the police under torture, shall be considered incontrovertible proof.* If, up to now, the sentences of the court to penal servitude were carried out only after examination of appeals to higher authorities — then now they will be executed immediately upon the adoption of a decision by the lowest authorities.

Finally, *there is being introduced a system of keeping under arrest, after their sentences are over, those who have not changed their convictions while in prison.* Special police detachments have been created this year, armed with machine guns for struggle against mass demonstrations. The workers' cultural organisations are subjected to savage repression. All professors who are of the least liberal inclinations are banished from the higher educational institutions, and the higher school is being transformed into an apparatus for the propagation of reactionary ideology and militant imperialism.

4.—THE SITUATION AMONG THE RULING CLASSES.

The struggle within the ruling classes, which led to the assassination of Innukai last year, has brought about the formation of Saito's cabinet. The military has the hegemony in this cabinet. This cabinet for the preparation of war was formed on the basis of a temporary agreement of different groups of the ruling classes. All groups of the ruling classes united on the basis of this programme: (1) the intensification of the struggle against the revolutionary movement; and (2) the re-arming of the army.

Of late the struggle within the ruling classes has sharpened anew, in connection with the arrival of the time for a final decision, on the question of the date of the beginning of the war which is being prepared by Japanese imperialism.

This, in its turn, brings up the question of the size of the military budget, and of methods of covering its deficit. A struggle for power is going on, around these questions, between the military and the old civilian bureaucracies. A struggle has developed between a group which considers a preliminary diplomatic preparation to be necessary before the war against the U.S.S.R. and the group which considers that the very fact of a war against the U.S.S.R. will create the international situation that is necessary for Japan. This struggle is, as yet, confined to government circles.

The old Seyukai and Minseito parties are weakened by internal dissensions, and are on the wane; they are losing their popularity. On the other hand, the military—whose strength and weight have grown unusually as a result of the war, and which is unquestionably heading for a military dictatorship—this military, nevertheless, considers that the establishment of such a dictatorship would be inopportune before the beginning of the war; it fears that it might lead to its discredit, and to the discredit of the army and of its policy in internal questions, during the period when the war has not yet started.

It is more advantageous for the military to play the part of a more or less opposition party, and to use social demagogy for ideological preparation for war.

For this reason it (the military) is striving for a dominating position—within the limits of the coalition cabinet for the present—with the idea of declaring its military dictatorship when the war starts. This situation may, however, lead to a flaring up of the struggle, and then it will doubtlessly take in questions of internal policy, including the question of the rural districts. And this, in its turn, is pregnant with important consequences—before all, with the intensification of the unrest within the country. Already, at this moment, the landowners are bringing up very sharply the question of prices on rice and of lowering taxes. Araki, who has already used this situation of late for pressure on the bourgeoisie, is now again threatening—carrying over his social demagogy to rural questions.

All efforts of the government, and of the reactionary fascist organisations, are directed towards pitching the growth of discontent among the asses, and their attention to questions of external policies — to the "critical" situation of pan—and to the expectation of war. All the actionary fascist organisations, headed by the vernment and its governing apparatus, are rrying on an ideological preparation for war at feverish speed. The propaganda of imperialis- nationalism and militant imperialism is carried to an unparalleled extent. Chauvinism and narchism appear as the basic principles of all ctions of the ruling classes. Some of them— e old reactionary organisations — stimulate auvinism and nationalism of the old style, and not raise the question of a change in internal licies. Another tendency, adherents of Araki, no make up the basic and controlling nucleus the *military-fascist* reaction at present, reno- te monarchistic and ultra-conservative (Black ndred) Japanism with demagogy about state ntrol over finance capital, struggle against the l political parties, and re-colour the despotic urgeois-manorial monarchy as a "popular" one hoping in this manner to win the masses over the side of war and the terroristic methods of e monarchical dictatorship of the big bour- oisie and landowners.

They develop this demagogy the more, inas- ich as it creates an ideological basis for the easures which will be necessary during the war, ch as: subjection of all industry to the control the Ministry of War; the formation of a mili- y dictatorship; and the preservation of civil ace during the war, under the banner of the narchy.

Finally, there is a third, different, faction of the scists—of the common, i.e., the civilian, type who have until the present been only an xiliary, pogrom detachment of the military and e financial oligarchy. This group is attempting exploit the growing discontent of the petty- urgeoisie and the peasant masses for the pur- se of forming fascist organisations among the ling masses, by means of the most barefaced tional and social demagogy against finance pital and against parliamentarianism; and by eans of the demagogic slogan of a "monarchy thout exploitation," etc.

Japanese fascism, with no distinction between different factions, is a shock detachment of e monarchy, and a new form of the subjugation the ruined masses of the petty-bourgeoisie of e cities and the villages to the financial bour- oisie and the big landowners. All the fascist ganisations are striving for maximum hastening the beginning of the war, and they all whole-heartedly support the military, in one way or another; but this does not mean that there is no internal conflict in the camp of the fascists. The policy of the military is the core of this conflict, and determines its course and direction. Thus, for instance, the temporary agreement of Araki's group with other groups of the ruling classes, and the curtailment of its social demagogy, led, on the one hand, to the splitting of the "state socialists," a considerable number of whom went over to the "Japanists"—and, on the other hand, to the beginning of a struggle against Araki on the part of some groups of fascists.

The basic thing, however, is the unity of all the fascist factions with the military. This found its expression in the fact that all the fascist groups came out in a united front for the defence of the assassins of Innukai. They are all taking part in the campaign for the collection of signatures for the lightening of their fate—a campaign which is assuming enormous dimensions.

5.—THE MIDDLE CLASSES AND THE PETTY-BOURGEOISIE.

The unrest and dissatisfaction among the middle classes, i.e., the small landowners and the rich peasants in the villages, and the petty business men and tradesmen in the city, by which the first half of 1932 was characterised, quieted down to a certain extent in the second half of 1932, in connection with the growth of industrial production, and the subsidies which the government gave to the landowners and the rich peasants. The dissatisfaction of the small manufacturers also quieted down, as they received considerable war orders.

The discontent of the petty tradesmen grows just as before. Thus, for example, in Osaka they formed a special society for struggle against the department stores. The petty and very small tradesmen make up a considerable section of the population of Japan—by some calculations up to 15 per cent. of the entire able-bodied population of the country. Cases are very frequent when the parents or separate members of a working-class family engage in small retail trade. Nevertheless, the C.P. of Japan has remained entirely indifferent to this situation, to the discontent of the innumerable masses of petty tradesmen.

The overwhelming majority of the petty-bourgeoisie is dominated by a chauvinistic frame of mind. The fascists are very successful in winning the petty-bourgeois masses over to their side. But, at the same time, there are facts which testify to the radicalisation of another section of the petty-bourgeois classes. This is testified to by the student movement, which has assumed unparalleled dimensions this year. This

movement was evoked by the government's repression of radically inclined professors. In answer to the dismissal of the radical professor Takinawa, a student strike broke out in Kioto. The strike lasted two months, and for the first time embraced the students of the entire imperial university. The events in Kioto evoked student protests and strikes in a number of cities. In Tokio, in particular, the strike of the students of the imperial university was accompanied by stormy demonstrations. Not only the imperial university, but also a number of other higher educational institutions of the city of Tokio participated in the demonstration of July 17th, 1932. Heavy clashes with the police took place during the strike, and 38 people were arrested.

The student movement was under the following slogans: autonomy and freedom for science; demands for the removal of the minister of education and the reactionary professors; and for a united front of the entire student body against the attempts of the government to "fascise" science and the higher schools.

A distinction of this student movement from the student movement of the past is that the committee which leads this movement in Kioto was organised as an underground committee. In Tokio the students have many times seized the auditoriums, driven out the reactionary professors, and organised meetings in place of lessons. The C.P. and the Y.C.L. have taken active part in this student movement.

The frame of mind of the student body is characterised by the fact that immediately after the mass arrests of the Communists and Young Communists, 1,000 yen was collected among the student body in a few months for the Communist press.

The strike movement among the clerical workers has also become stronger of late. It is characteristic that in the leaflet issued by the striking cinema workers demands were set forth for "Freedom for all the people," and "against police pressure in the strike struggle."

6.—THE PENETRATION OF FASCISM AND CHAUVINISM INTO THE WORKING MASSES.

A number of fascist organisations are concentrating their forces on the creation of their units among the workers. In a number of shops and factories they have created their own fascist trade unions. However, a number of reports testify that the workers who enter the fascist organisations are very far from accepting the fascist programme. Thus, for example, "Sekki"* quotes a description of one meeting of the fascist organisation of the Isikowasimo factory. The patriotic war agitation of the officers and Buddhist priests who spoke at the meeting was met far from sympathetically by the gathering. They were forced to stop their agitation, and the leader of the fascist organisation of that factory spoke in their place. He said, on the one hand, that it is necessary to protest against war—yet, on the other hand, he tried to defend that same war. The gathering greeted him with cries of "Enough!" "Down with him!" and the meeting closed in disorder.

Chauvinistic propaganda is carried on to an enormous extent among the working masses. The entire system of the government apparatus and the mass patriotic organisations, and the fascists, the industrialists, and the entire factory administration are mobilised for this. In the factories, units of the patriotic organisations are formed, and collections of funds for defence are carried on. The bourgeois magazine, "Nihon Keisan Neino," writes of the character of these collections:—

> "But to what extent are these donations voluntary?"

Concerning this question we have written the following:—

> "At first, this movement for the collections did not carry an organised character; but it gradually took an organised path. In the provinces, districts and villages there were created 'societies for the collection of donations for war needs.' Sums were assigned beforehand, and these sums became compulsory. After that they began to be assigned to each house and are collected forcibly by the organisations 'Seinendai' and the "Dzaiyugundzin.' Thus, it is simply a form of taxation."

Chauvinistic agitation within the working class has grown into a menacing danger. However, the summation of the collections of means for defence shows that the basic masses of the workers have not yielded to this propaganda. At a time when hundreds of thousands of workers were accounted members of the patriotic organisations, and when these collections were conducted under the threat of police repression and dismissal from the factories—at this same time, not more than 160,000 people took part in these collections. If the entire situation is taken into account, then it is more accurate to speak of the failure of these collections than to speak of their success.

7.—THE RADICALISATION OF THE WORKING AND PEASANT MASSES.

The basic decisive fact for any appraisal of the situation is the continuing radicalisation of the working masses. The second half of last year

* The organ of the C.P. of Japan.

marked by a number of big demonstrations political character.

movement has developed *against the trial of communists. Resolutions of protest have adopted in over* 100 *shops and factories. A demonstration against the trial of the communists took place in the working-class section Tokio (Koto).* Two thousand people took part his demonstration.

n August 1st, 1932, two big demonstrations e organised in Tokio : one of 1,500 people, the r of 2,000 people. It is characteristic that political demonstrations of 1932 were started small groups of communists, but that they e joined by considerable masses of non-party kers.

he workers of the big Sibaure factory answered a political strike against the dismissal of a gate elected by them for a trip to the U.S.S.R. so far as it is possible, the bourgeois press fully covers the political manifestations of the kers. Thus, for instance, facts are quoted in magazine of the C.C.C.P.J., "The Party der," about political strikes in individual facs on the anniversary of the October Revolu- and on May-Day; nothing was reported on e in the bourgeois press.

he growth of open political manifestations cut off temporarily by the mass arrests of munists and the breaking up of a number of y organisations in October, 1932, when, as a lt of the work of provocateurs in the apparaof the C.C., over 1,700 members were arrested. se mass arrests coincided with a strengthening he illusions of the workers—that the war had ed with great success for Japan. They coind with the imaginary economic revival, with growth of chauvinism in the country, and with sual intensification of police terror.

fter this there were no open political manifesns on the streets; but the following facts k of the political leanings of the advanced ons of the proletariat, and of the continuing lutionisation of the workers; in a number of ories—including the war equipment factory, del, in the Hiro trolley park, and in other es, the workers answered *compulsory collec- for defence with sabotage. The legal left unions of the electrical workers and the icipal workers came out openly against colns for war and against air manoeuvres.*

ue position taken by the trade union organisa- of Haido is very significant. Breaking off the left reformist trade unions, and uniting v thousand workers, they issued their own paper, in which they carry on an active gle against war, for the defence of the S.R., for united front from below, against the legal socialist party (i.e., against the social-democracy), etc. These organisations participate actively with the C.P. in the united front organisations.

The anti-war propaganda of the C.P. is carried on in all the important industrial centres, and in a number of peasant prefectures. Anti-war agitation is also carried on by groups formed at the initiative of the workers themselves. In the prefecture Hirosima, an anti-war leaflet was signed in the name of the Workers' Anti-War Society, and, despite many arrests, the work of this revolutionary organisation is being intensified.

In Kioto, the reactionary organisation of the reservists conducted a campaign for the collection of gifts for the front. About 2,000 sacks of gifts were collected. *According to the report of the bourgeois press, anti-war propaganda or proletarian literature was discovered in most of these sacks.* This sort of thing can be observed in a number of other places also.

The number of labour disputes and strikes is increasing. Thus in the first half of 1932 there were 944 strikes, with 48,000 participants; in the second half of 1932—982 strikes, with 49,500 participants; and in the first half of 1933—842 strikes, with 53,200 people participating. During the last few months, the number of strikes has continued to grow. *Even more significant is the increase in the number of strikes for higher wages.* The strikes for higher wages made up, in the first half of 1932, 15 per cent. of the total number of strikes; in the second half of 1932—20.5 per cent., and in the first half of 1933—34 per cent.

Strikes in Japan take place mainly in the small and middle-sized shops and factories. In the big shops and factories, the Social-Democrats are still retaining their position, with the help of the powerful apparatus of trustified capital and concentrated police force; and the strike movement there is extremely weak. Recently, however, one may notice an intensification of the struggle of the workers in the big shops and factories.

In the big shops and factories, as a rule, as soon as the capitalists are convinced that they are threatened with serious opposition from the workers, they make concessions—without waiting for the struggle to spread. As an example, take the Mitsubishi factory in Kobe, where, despite the arrests of Communists, the influence of the C.P. has not weakened—especially in the Diesel department. This department, 120 people in number, was the first to start the strike. 400 turners supported them. Unrest started among all the 7,000 workers of the factory. Demands were advanced for the abolition of the system of rush jobs, for a 10 per cent. increase in wages,

for an 8-hour working day, and for other conditions. The striking workers organised their own independent strike, and called on the trade unions for solidarity. The capitalists—not waiting for the strike to spread—made concessions not only to the Diesel department, but also to all the workers of the factory.

In the aviation factory in Nagoye, at the end of this year, 270 unorganised discharged workers started a movement against the administration; but as 4,000 of the 7,000 workers of this factory were also temporary workers, the unrest seized them all. The employers immediately made concessions: they gave the discharged workers 100 days' notice; and the temporary workers, who had until then been employed by the contractor, were re-employed as workers of the factory, and were given equal rights with the regular workers.

These disturbances found response in other factories in Nagoye, as for instance in the clock factory (a war factory) Onti Tokei Kodzio, where a few thousand workers are employed, and where also the system of temporary work was flourishing. The echo of the struggle in the aviation factory was enough to make the capitalists there grant concessions before any were demanded.

There have been strikes in a number of other war factories—in the Fudzinata shipyard, where the workers obtained a rise in wages, and in others. Lately, the Ministry of internal affairs has introduced compulsory arbitration, which is obligatory for both employers and workers. Through these measures, the government is attempting to definitely forbid strikes.

* * *

The peasant movement grows much more swiftly: the number of peasant conflicts in the first half of 1933 is 60 *per cent.* greater than the number for the same period in 1932.

The most characteristic thing about the peasant movement is the fact that the struggle *against the driving of the peasant from the land* takes first place. Manifestations of this character make up 62 per cent. of the total number of manifestations. The petitional manifestations, which took place last year, stopped after the rich peasants and small landowners left the movement. Now, the movement for the lowering of rural taxes is growing up anew. In October of last year, in the Totori prefecture, the rent conflict—for the first time in the history of the peasant movement—*grew into a genuine peasant insurrection.* In answer to the arrest of their leader, the peasants, 3,000 in number, headed by the Young Communists, arranged demonstrations demanding the freedom of the arrested man, attacked the police station, and were scattered only after a violent clash with the police.

The active forms of the struggle of the workers and peasants lag far behind the level of discontent of the masses. This is explained by many reasons, and first of all by the great pressure of police terror. No less significance attaches to the fact that the workers and peasants of Japan have not yet tried their strength on open class collisions. For this reason, special attention is deserved by a number of facts which testify that as soon as there appears any legal possibility for mass manifestations, they swiftly become revolutionised. Thus, for instance, a bourgeois newspaper reports that on the island Okinawa the bourgeois-manorial party Minseito organised a movement—on the question of the building of a hospital for lepers — against the municipal government, which was under control of the other bourgeois-manorial party, the Seiyukai. The Minseito movement embraced about 100,000 workers. The revolutionary peasant organisations made use of this movement, and advanced demands for the cancellation of debts. The police then arrested the leader of this revolutionary organisation. Then 5,000 peasants organised a demonstration against the police and demanded that he be freed. The local village government came out against this demonstration. Then these 5,000 peasants seized the headquarters of the local government, drove out the village chairman who had been appointed by the governor, and transformed this local government into a base for their movement.

In Nagoye, the local city government arranged a city festival, in September of this year, on the occasion of the passing of the million mark by the city's population. The revolutionary committee of the unemployed and the illegal union of building workers Dzenkio, which existed in Nagoye, formed a workers' league of struggle against this festival. They collected over 5,000 signatures; and on the morning of the gala day, crowds of unemployed, 200-500 strong, collected at five unemployment bureaux, and organised a demonstration of protest against this celebration, and for a number of their demands. The demonstration was immediately dispersed by the police. However, the city government was so alarmed that it immediately satisfied a number of the demands of the unemployed, such as the distribution to the unemployed of tickets for dinners and for rice, the organisation of public work for the unemployed, etc.

Demonstrations of unemployed and of peasants have taken place in a number of sections. Everywhere, as soon as the workers or peasants

ame out actively, the local authorities — along ith savage repressions — made concessions to e actively demonstrating masses. All this indi- ates that it is necessary to make use of every pportunity for the organisation of active demon- rations for partial demands; for in this lies the ossibility of widening the movement, and of ising the level of its demands.

8.—THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY.

Until last year there existed in Japan two basic cial-democrat parties, each supported by its own ade-union federation. The "left" social- mocrat party and its trade unions were dis- nguished by the fact that the aristocracy of bour played a much smaller rôle among them an in the "right" wing; and the mass of its embers was made up of workers in unprivileged ops and factories, for the most part small con- rns. Consequently, their leaders resort to evolutionary" phraseology to a much greater gree than the "right" leaders.

Last year these parties united into one social- mocrat party, and their trade unions into one ngress of trade unions. However, the affair nt no further than the unity of the leaders. e lower organisations have not merged, and e struggle between them continues.

Together with the growth of fascist reaction in e country, the process of fascisation of the cial democracy is gathering speed. The C.C. the united S.-D.s issued its new programme s year. The basic points of this programme low :—

"1. The calling of a *national economic con- ess*. For the purpose of overcoming the eatening situation of our economy, and of ablishing our economic independence, our party oposes the immediate calling of a national nomic congress; and the use of a petition vement to accomplish this. The congress ould consist of :—

(a) trained specialists, people to be designated by the government from workers' and capitalists organisations;

(b) people elected from the workers' and peasants' organisations, and the organisations of the technicians, the capitalists, and the landowners; and representatives of the manufacturing sections of the commercial and industrial associations;

(c) people elected by general vote, according to election districts;

(d) representatives of the colonial peoples;

(e) representatives of the government;

(f) representatives of the army and the navy."

This is followed by a legally worked out statute the national economic congress.

"2. The calling of an *eastern economic conference* for the discussion of the present international situation. In calling an economic conference of all the countries, Japan must advance the cause of co-operation of all countries of the Orient, and thus attain full stabilisation of the Orient. Along with this, Japan will remove all obstacles which hinder the countries of the Orient from developing out of their backward position and attaining equality with all the peoples of the world, and peace all over the world.

"To this conference must be invited the U.S.S.R., Manchuria, China, Siam, the Philippines, and Indonesia, with 24 people from each country—6 delegates each from the government, the capitalists, the workers, and the peasants.

"3. Mass inflation is favourable for the lower classes, since it increases the buying power of the masses, raises the standard of living of the masses, and at the same time stimulates production, being profitable for the capitalists. Mass inflation means the raising of wages and salaries by 30 per cent., the creation of agricultural work for the unemployed, the granting of subsidies to the small and middle-sized industrialists, and help to the poverty-stricken peasants.

"4. The raising of taxes for financial stabilisation, and in particular the raising of the inheritance tax 1,000 per cent. and the property and income taxes 300 per cent., and the establishment of taxes on the raising of prices."

Thus the social-democrats come forward with a great "constructive" programme for collaboration of labour with capital on a state and international scale; with a programme directed toward the accomplishment of all the aims of the foreign policy of Japanese imperialism. It is a programme of fascism in parliamentary form. It has met with opposition from individual organisations. Thus, at the Plenum of the C.C. of the Taisyuto (the S.-D. party of Japan), the delegates of the Osaka, Nagono, and Fukusima organisations came out sharply against this new programme. The Osaka delegation to the Plenum of the C.C. declared: "The content of the national economic congress is seemingly not fascist, but in actual fact it is fascist. And the eastern economic conference is an even more reactionary suggestion; it is nothing more or less than the creation of a capitalistic military-economic bloc."

The degree of fascisation of the social-democracy is shown also by the speeches of the leader of the Siakai Taisyuto, and deputy to parliament, Yosiwa, who declared, at a conference of textile workers: "Although there are differences of opinion between us and the patriotic fascist organisations, still we must not look on them as

enemies, for these organisations also regard capitalism as their enemy."

But at the same time disillusion is growing among the S.-D. workers. This disillusionment is especially intensified by the fact that the S.-D.s are carrying through a line of restraining the masses from any active manifestations.

At the 21st conference of the right trade unions, the Sodomei, in November, 1932, this resolution was adopted: "Our basic line comes to this: that there should be as few strikes as possible. Our policy is to decrease the number of strikes, because we follow the course of developing the collective agreement movement; and the attainment of normal relations between labour and capital must be welcomed not only from an industrial viewpoint, but also in the sense of a curtailment of union expenditures on the struggle."

Sodomei comes out especially strongly against workers' unrest in the military factories — considering this impermissible, "since Japan is in a critical position." The social-democracy appeals for passivity, trying to convince the workers that they should not demonstrate actively. Thus, for instance, the Japanese social-democratic organ, "Taisyu-simbum," writes: "A period of reaction has set in, in Japan just as in all countries. This hinders our advance. We will not go against the current."

On the one hand, this struggle of the social-democrats against active manifestations of the workers helps the growth of fascism among the workers—which operates by means of social-demagogy and internal activity; and on the other hand, where the Communists work in the reformist unions and among the worker social-democrats, a considerable group of S.-D.s become radicalised and turn towards the Communists.

On the significant successes of the C.P. in the matter of its Bolshevisation and tasks we will dwell in the next article.

THE INTENSIFICATION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY CRISIS IN SPAIN AND THE TASKS OF THE C.P.S.

By A. Brones.

(*Continuation*)

IV.

THE acceleration of revolutionary events has provided the Party with more suitable conditions for the organisation of the masses and the leadership of their rapidly developing struggle.

The revolutionary upsurge among the masses has already lasted over two and a half years. During this time, the bourgeois-landlord *bloc* has not succeded in retarding the growth of the revolutionary pressure of the masses and strengthening its régime. On the contrary, the stormy revolutionary upsurge is increasing more and more in the conditions of intensifying economic crisis, although this increase is not even and takes the most varied forms. It sharpens the differences and disagreements inside the ruling classes, thus creating the prerequisites for the growth of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into proletarian revolution. A decisive importance attaches to the part played by the Communist Party under these conditions, which is the only force capable of securing the further development of the revolution and not permitting it to stop half-way. Much in the further fate of the revolution depends on the clarity and decision of its line, on its determination and endurance in the struggle. Political leadership on its part, of the struggle of the masses, alone can repulse the danger of Fascism and ensure the final victory of the revolution.

In this respect, the Party has not achieved a decisive turn during the last year, it has not yet succeeded in becoming the guiding force in the maturing revolution.

It would, of course, be a great mistake to fail to note the very considerable achievements of our Party. Immediately after the Twelfth Plenum of the E.C.C.I. it repulsed the attempts of the sectarian-opportunist renegade group of Adame-Trilla-Bulljos, to lead the Party into the mire of opportunism and treachery with determination and unanimity; under the leadership of its Central Committee and with the support of the E.C.C.I. the Party firmly adopted the line of the Communist International. It established its daily central organ, and by means of mass campaigns secured its existence and protected it against the numerous attacks of its enemies. In the contest for the majority of the working class, the Party succeeded in smashing a number of petty-bourgeois groupings, in bringing to its side

ew sections of revolutionary workers and peas-nts, and also in winning its first foothold in the ounter-revolutionary Corteses. The member-hip of the Party has doubled since its Fourth Congress and now is close on 25,000; the organ-sation has been extended to the whole of the ountry. Owing to mass political campaigns, he political influence of the Party has grown onsiderably; during the most recent of these ampaigns over a hundred reformist and anar-hist trade union organisations openly joined in ur struggle, in spite of the expulsions carried hrough by the treacherous leaders. At the same ime the leading rôle of the Party has gained mportance in the daily struggle of the proletariat nd toiling peasantry, and the mass action of the niners in Asturias and Linares, of the workers and easants in Toledo and Zamora, in Andalusia and Extremadura took place with considerable or ven decisive leadership on the part of the Party. he creation of the C.N.T.U.* and the extension f the trade union unity movement have brought nto existence a strong mass base, made up of ver 150,000 organised workers. A considerable rowth has taken place among the mass organ-sations, such as the International Labour Defence, the Friends of the Soviet Union, the Anti-Fascist Front," and various cultural-ducational, sports and other organisations, hich are joined by tens of thousands of orkers who are unorganised or belong to other olitical or trade union organisations.

However, in spite of the undoubtedly great mportance of all these achievements, they do not orrespond to the great possibilities afforded our arty by the rapidly growing revolutionary up-urge among the masses. Particularly great are eir shortcomings in connection with the de-ands of the rapidly expanding revolutionary ovement, in which the absence of constant ecisive leadership on the part of our Party is ver more acutely felt. The Party did not suc-eed in abruptly changing the existing situation f the prevalence of spontaneity and absence of rganisation in the action taken by the working nd peasant masses, which in other cases fell nder the influence of the traitor reformist aders. In spite of the growing distrust felt by e masses towards these leaders, and the grow-g desertions of the masses from their organisa-ons, and the process of disintegration beginning the C.N.T., these organisations still embrace undreds of thousands of workers, and our Party as still not succeeded in winning the bulk of ese masses to its side.

This situation cannot, of course, be explained ly by the difficult and complex situation in which the struggle of our Party is taking place. There can be no doubt that the Party is faced with the greatest difficulties and gigantic tasks, which grow up on account of the rapidly intensifying revolutionary crisis. However, the Communist Party is strong enough by means of a correct line and great activity to overcome these difficulties and secure the rapid advance of the revolutionary vanguard. The causes of the slow development of our Party and insufficient leadership of the revolutionary movement of the masses on its part must be sought in our mistakes, in the weak points in our work.

Since the time of the Twelfth Plenum of the E.C.C.I. the Party has permitted a number of errors to creep in which it will be able to overcome only by means of real Bolshevik self-criticism. In the conditions of the intensifying revolutionary crisis the government of the bourgeois-landlord *bloc* proved weak and unstable, and a number of government crises, caused by the rapidly developing revolutionary struggle against the background of growing economic impoverishment, exposed the true face of the bourgeoisie-landlord *bloc*, and its hurried preparations against the insurgent masses of the people before them. Under these circumstances the question of preparing the masses politically and organisationally for the struggle for power acquired a decisive importance and should have become the centre of the Party's whole activity.

"The main question of every revolution is, undoubtedly, the question of state power."* It is not a question, at the present moment, when the Party is not yet followed by the main body of the proletarian masses and does not lead as yet the great peasant movement, of throwing out the slogan of the immediate overthrow of the régime of the landlords and capitalists. But the principal task of the Party was to explain to the masses, constantly and insistently, the true nature of the existing government, combining the slogan of the struggle for power with the partial demands advanced by the masses in their daily struggle, to face them with the necessity for fighting for a workers' and peasants' government, which alone is able to alter conditions of existence for the masses.

In this respect there were mistakes in the activities of the Party which lessened the political preparedness of the masses and undoubtedly put difficulties in the way of the Party in its struggle for the masses against the Social-Fascist and anarchist leaders. Underestimation of the importance of the task and the slogan of the fight for power was manifested in the decision of the

* Red Trade Union Federation.

* Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XXI.

Political Bureau of the Central Committee, in February, 1933; it found expression in a whole series of other Party documents, and lately also in the incorrect estimate sometimes given of the government of Leroux as a "landlords' government," in the belated mobilisation of the masses against this government as the government of preparation for Fascist dictatorship. In particular did this find expression in the slogan which the Party has lately been advancing of dissolution of parliament and new elections, the advancing of which as the *central slogan* showed an incorrect estimate of the sharpening of the revolutionary crisis.

The incomplete realisation by the Party of the task of politically and organisationally preparing the masses for the struggle for power also found expression in underestimation of the importance of the factory committees and peasants' committees as the basis in the organisation of revolution. The work of organising the masses is very closely bound up with the task of setting up and strengthening these revolutionary organs of the united front. This most important task proclaimed by the Twelfth Plenum of the E.C.C.I was not properly in the centre of attention and activity of the whole Party. The Party proved unable to make use of the correct methods for strengthening and breathing life into the existing factory and peasants' committees and the establishment of new ones. This serious political error found its reflection in a certain relaxing of the activity of the factory and peasant committees and a slowing down in the work of the newly established ones.

In the fight against Fascism the Party, in spite of some very good examples of mobilisation of the masses, has proved unable to carry on constant and thorough ideological work in the masses which would expose the essence of the social demagogy of Fascism and arm the masses ideologically against it. The fight against Social-Fascism and anarchism also lacked timely ideological work in the masses. Particularly in the fight against anarchism did the Party prove unable to expose thoroughly its class nature, and sometimes advanced slogans which hindered the going over of workers who were leaving the ranks of the anarchists to the position of the Communist Party. Thus, for instance, the Party's exposure of only "certain" of the leaders of anarchism as traitors to the revolution and weapons in the hands of the bourgeoisie could not help in explaining to the masses of C.N.T.* workers the hostile character of anarchism towards revolution.

The great extent to which the Party lagged behind in the leadership of the daily struggle of the masses and in the trade union movement is to a high degree explained by the fact that our central and local guiding organs do not devote enough attention to these questions and that the Party is not sufficiently acquainted with, and does not constantly discuss, the experience, achievements, and errors of this most important work.

These and other serious errors the Party must show up completely by means of thorough self-criticism, and on this basis overcome them, thus facilitating the fulfilment of its most important immediate tasks.

V.

Under these circumstances the Communist Party of Spain is confronted with gigantic tasks of the greatest responsibility.

In spite of all the efforts made by the bourgeois-landlord *bloc* and its government, *the revolution of the workers and peasants is rapidly developing, bringing the masses closer and closer up to direct struggle for power.* In all the action which they take, in all the strikes, demonstrations, in the fight for land, the struggling masses come more and more into conflict with the apparatus of power of the landlords and capitalists. Through their own hard experience they come to see that this power stands in their way on the road to freedom and better life. The masses of workers and peasants seek ever more insistently real revolutionary leadership in the struggle for the overthrow of the existing régime. This striving to find the right way and really revolutionary leadership will intensify considerably in connection with the new approaching series of revolutionary battles.

Thus, the political and organisational preparation of the masses for the struggle for power is the central task of the Party. All the activity of the Party must be directed to working deep into the minds of the masses the necessity for doing away with the criminal policy of the landlords and capitalists, and to prepare rapidly for the decisive struggle, making use of the dates fixed by the course of the revolution itself. We must intensify the struggle against the bourgeois-landlord government by every possible means, must make the masses see clearly the whole extent to which it is responsible for the increasing ruin, for the starvation and poverty suffered by the masses, that they should see the intensifying fascisation of the bourgeoisie and its government, which brings in its train more disaster and persecution for them. The Party must constantly inform the masses of the course of revolutionary events, uniting them

* Reformist Union Federation.

round its slogans. Each step of this government, each manœuvre, must be explained to the masses at the time. Against each measure of the government against the people, each act of political error, and so on, we must rouse the anger of the masses, rouse them to struggle against the power of the landlords and capitalists.

All the propaganda of the Party, all its organisational work, must be directed to preparation for the *revolutionary overthrow of the government of landlords and capitalists and the establishment of a workers' and peasants' government in the form of soviets.*

In the face of ever-growing persecution the Party must prove able to find a road to the masses for itself. In the moments of sharpening struggle, hundreds of agitators and organisers must be sent to the factories, the villages and the barracks, thousands of illegal leaflets, papers and pamphlets must proclaim to the masses the position of the Party, replacing the Party publications prohibited or confiscated by the government. From day to day the Party must widely popularise, as the only way out for the broad masses of workers and peasants from their increasing need and disaster, the slogan of a workers' and peasants' government, of the government which will give the toilers work, bread and land.

Proclamation among the masses of the slogan of a workers' and peasants' government must be accompanied by a revolutionary programme which such a government would put into effect without delay after the victory of the revolution of the workers and peasants. Thus the Central Committee of the Party was right in drawing up such a programme, and the Party must achieve successful popularisation of it among the widest masses of the toilers. Guiding the struggle of the toiling peasantry and the agricultural labourers for their principal demands, mobilising the masses of the industrial proletariat for the defence of their interests, widely popularising the revolutionary programme of the workers' and peasants' government in the countryside, and fighting for the realisation of this programme, the Party will realise the revolutionary union of workers and peasants and ensure the leadership of the proletariat in the growing agrarian revolution.

The principal points of this programme, which will undoubtedly increase the activeness of the Party and strengthen the ties binding it with the masses are (1) Confiscation without right of repurchase of all lands belonging to landlords, the Church, monasteries, the state and municipalities, together with all movable and immovable stock, and their transfer *without compensation* to and division among the toiling peasantry and agricultural labourers; (2) Abolition of all peasants' debts, of all feudal and semi-feudal oppressions (foros, rabassa morta, etc.), of all the taxes of the bourgeois-landlord régime; (3) Rendering of immediate assistance to the peasantry by the workers' and peasants' government with credits, seeds and machinery; (4) Far-reaching measures on the part of the workers' and peasants' government for immediate decided improvement of the material conditions of the agricultural labourers; (5) Confiscation and nationalisation of enterprises of large-scale cartellised production; control of the soviets over production and distribution; nationalisation of banks, railways and all large-scale capitalist means of transport and communication (autobuses, tramways, ships, aviation, telephone, radio); (6) General introduction of the 7-hour working day and raising of the living standard of the toiling masses. Measures for assistance to and employment of the unemployed; (7) Full sickness, accident, unemployment and disability insurance at the expense of the state, the nationalised industry and the unexpropriated owners; (8) National liberation of all oppressed peoples (Catalonia, Biscay, Galicia) on the basis of the right of these peoples to self-determination up to separation from Spain; (9) Complete immediate liberation of the colonies; (10) Abolition of the gendarmerie (Guardia Civil) the storm police (Guardia de Asalto) and all armed forces of the landlords and capitalists; general arming of the workers and peasants; eradication of the bureaucracy hostile to the masses of the people and election of public officers by the soviets; (11) Abolition of the permanent army as the instrument of the landlords and capitalists and of the ranks of officers and generals; democratic election of officers by the soldiers, election of deputies by the soldiers into the soviets of workers' peasants' and soldiers' deputies; establishment of a workers' and peasants' Red Army for the defence of the interests of the masses of the people; (12) Proletarian solidarity with the oppressed of the whole world and fraternal union with the U.S.S.R.

In popularising this programme among the masses, it is necessary to explain to them that security for success in carrying it out lies in the fact that the workers' and peasants' government will be a real government of the masses of the people and will be supported by the workers and peasants and their revolutionary organs of power, the soviets, which will raze to the ground the apparatus of the bourgeois-landlord government, and ensure the wide participation of the toiling masses in the rule of their own state.

However, successful struggle for the workers'

and peasants' government is possible only if the Party, unremittingly leading the struggle of the working and peasant masses, proves able to combine this programme and the slogan of the struggle for power with their daily demands. But, in order to accomplish this, it is necessary to make an abrupt turn in the whole practical work of the Party, in its leadership of the strike movement. The Party organisations must actively intervene in the smallest conflict between the workers and capitalists, using the discontent and anger of the workers to prepare and organise their struggle. The Communists must be the first to come to the fighting workers and help them in drawing up their demands, and in the organisation of organs of struggle—struggle and strike committees, on the basis of extensive application of the united front. We must bring about such a state of affairs that the Social-Fascist and anarchist bosses, who make capital mainly out of the helplessness and political immaturity of the workers, should not be able to impose their leadership on them, which is a synonym for the betrayal and defeat of the workers. In this daily struggle the Party can best expose the treachery of the Social-Fascist and anarchist leaders before the masses, and isolate them from the masses; in it, it can most easily prove to the masses the necessity for struggle for their own workers' and peasants' government. In extending single cases of action by the workers to whole districts, provinces, branches of industry, the Party must put before the masses the object of *a general political strike*, as an immediate practical task, which leads up to the decisive struggle for the overthrow of the bourgeois-landlord government. In the daily sharpening struggle of the toiling masses we must make use of the particularly important points, which rouse the masses of the toilers, such as the death sentence of six Castilblanco peasants, preparation for the railwaymen's strike, and the struggle against repressions and Fascism, to popularise in the masses the slogan of a general political strike and call on them to prepare for this and carry it out.

In this work the Party must fight with determination against opportunist underestimation of the necessity for preparing for and carrying out the general strike, and also against the very dangerous practice of declaring strikes which have not been prepared for, for they weaken the workers and allow the bourgeoisie and its agents to disorganise their struggle.

In the developing agrarian revolution, the Party must direct all its efforts to winning the leadership in the struggle of the toiling peasants and agricultural labourers for the land, cattle and harvest of the landlords. Advancing as the principal slogan of the revolution in the village that of *seizure and division* by the peasants and labourers of the landlords' lands, and also of their cattle, stock and harvest, our local organisations must lead this struggle, making their most important task the *organisation* of this movement and the establishment of leading organs in the struggle—peasants' committees. It is necessary to mass the activity of the whole Party for supporting the heroic struggle which the peasants and labourers are now waging in the provinces of Estremadura and Andalusia against the landlords and the whole apparatus of the bourgeois-landlord government, to extend this struggle to the neighbouring districts and provinces, and secure active support and leadership for them on the part of the industrial proletariat.

However, while leading this struggle, the Party must also devote much attention to the organisation and leadership of the daily struggle of the toiling masses in the village for their partial demands. It must organise and lead the struggle of the agricultural labourers for higher wages, shorter hours, against dismissals and unemployment, for complete insurance for agricultural labourers at the expense of the state and the landlords. It is necessary to organise the struggle of the peasant masses against the payment of taxes, of semi-feudal duties, such as the rabassa morta, the foros, etc., against peasants' discharging state and communal obligations, for state aid to districts suffering famine, etc. In this struggle our Party organisations must strive by exposing the treachery of the Social-Fascist and anarchist leaders at every opportunity, to unite the action of the peasants and agricultural labourers and secure the active support of the urban proletariat for their struggle.

A most important prerequisite in the struggle for the overthrow of the bourgeois-landlord régime and the establishment of a workers' and peasants' government is the unification, under common slogans of the extending battles, of the working class and the peasant masses with the struggle of oppressed and enslaved peoples and the drawing into this struggle of the soldiers, who are growing ever more revolutionary, among whom the Party must strengthen its work by all possible means at the present moment.

The Party must strengthen its struggle against Fascism with determination, and show the masses that the Communist Party is the only force which ensures the victory of the masses in this struggle. This requires, together with large-scale mass campaigns, a strengthening of

leological and educational work, which ıould expose the real content of social dema- ɔgy (which has lately increased to a great xtent) to the masses. It is also necessary to rengthen greatly our ideological struggle gainst the Social-Fascists and Anarcho- ascists.

In the political and organisational preparation the masses for the struggle for power, the arty must exert itself to the utmost for the stablishment of new and strengthening of the xisting *factory and peasants' committees.*

The extent to which the Party was behind- and in the organisation of the masses by means factory and peasant committees is due to the ıct that it underestimated these most import- ıt organs of revolutionary struggle, and failed carry out the tasks with which it was con- onted as far back as the Twelfth Plenum.

The Party must correct the mistakes which it as made without delay, and carry on extensive ork for the creation of a network of factory nd peasants' committees throughout the ountry.

The question of factory and peasants' com- ittees must be fully explained by the Party mong the masses and must become the *central, odal point* of the whole activity of the Party at ıe present time. In all the organisations of the arty, from the cell to the Central Committee, our press and pamphlets, at mass meetings, its daily work, this question must be accorded e greatest prominence, as the question of ganising the revolution and actively preparing e toiling masses for the struggle for power. Ve must bring about a state of affairs when ery worker and peasant who now closely con- rns himself with questions of the revolution ould know that these organs of struggle of the orking and peasant masses are levers by means which they will be able to move the revolution and secure conditions for its growing into a oletarian revolution. Factory and peasants' mmittees, established on the basis of a broad ited front, and elected by all the workers in e factory or peasants in the village as organs ich represent their daily interests and lead eir struggle, will play a decisive part in uniting e revolutionary mass movement, which at pre- nt is at loggerheads, thanks to the traitor ders of Social-Fascism and Anarcho-Fascism. the same time, these organs will broaden the sis for the growing trade union unity move- nt, and will make it possible for the Party to nove the masses from the influence of the cial-Fascists and anarchists, and isolate from m the leaders of these parties. The factory l peasants' committees will also undertake the organisation of an extensive mass workers' and peasants' militia. They will head the struggle of the masses against Fascism, and will, granted correct and constant guidance on the part of the Party, be the best and surest leaders of the masses in the fight for overthrowing the régime of the landlords and capitalists. Through these organs the foremost workers and poor peasants will learn to defend in practice the interests of the proletariat and toiling masses, and in this way the factory and peasants' committees will, by their activity, open up the road to the soviets of workers', peasants' and soldiers' deputies.

All these points must be constantly and unremittingly explained to the masses, which must be called to active struggle for factory and peasants' committees. It is at present particularly important to *win* these organs in the daily struggle of the workers and peasants for their partial demands. Wherever the struggle is beginning, where the workers advance demands for better living conditions, one of the principal demands, and one to be fought for, should be *recognition* of the factory and peasants' committees by the owners and landlords as *permanent* representative organs of the toiling masses. We must win for these organs a whole number of fundamental rights which will bind them closely with the whole life of the proletarian and peasant masses in their function of supervision over employment and dismissal of workers, over working hours, over conditions of work in the factory, over the payment of tariff rates and observance of the correct pay-days. Acting in the name of the factory masses in all questions bearing on their life, the factory committees must lead the struggle of the masses for extension of these rights into broad workers' control. We must bring about a state of affairs in which every worker who has any differences with the administration of the factory, or with other workers, or who has some demand to make, should know that the factory committee would find the best and quickest solution; in which the factory committee will have a permanent office inside the factory, at its expense, and the members of the committee be paid by the factory. With this in view, it is necessary to enliven the whole work of the already existing factory committees, and to reorganise them correspondingly, paying particular attention to the setting up of new factory committees in such industrial centres as Catalonia, Biscay and Asturias.

It is necessary to strengthen the campaign for the establishment of peasants' committees, particularly in districts of developing agrarian revolution; in the first place in the provinces of Badajoz, Caceres, Seville, Toledo, Jaen,

Salamanca, and Ciudad Real. The peasants' committees must not only lead the struggle of the toiling masses in the village for seizing, dividing and defending from the attacks of the landlords and the government the land, cattle and harvest, but must also undertake the protection of the daily interests of the toiling peasantry and labourers, removing officials and institutions of a government or municipal nature. In this way the factory and peasants' committees, thanks to their daily activity, will be really representative organs of the toiling masses and will, in the course of the revolutionary struggle, become approaches to the winning of soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies.

In its daily work, particularly in connection with the extending daily struggle of the toiling masses, and the campaign for factory and peasants' committees, the Party must popularise the slogan of the soviets as organs of revolutionary struggle for power. While at present not setting itself the task of setting up soviets everywhere, the Party must, in connection with the sharpening of the revolutionary struggle, aim at establishing soviets wherever the masses follow us, and the traitor leaders have been sufficiently exposed. It must devote a great deal of attention to preparing for the coming elections to parliament and the municipal bodies. In the election campaign, which must be closely bound up with the growing struggle of the masses, the Party will be able to explain its main slogans to large sections of the masses and make use of the elections for preparing the masses politically and organisationally for the struggle for power.

In the fight for setting up factory and peasants' committees and for winning over the majority of the working class, the revolutionary trade union movement must play a part of the first importance. For that reason the attention of the whole Party must be directed to strengthening by all possible means the trade union movement. This is particularly necessary now in connection with the coming congress of the C.N.T.U., which must be the beginning of a marked advance in our whole trade union work.

The first and most elementary rule, which up to now has nevertheless been neglected, is that every member of the Party must take an active part in trade union work, and that the Red trade unions should be able to increase their membership considerably owing to intense work on the part of the Communists. Questions of the C.N.T.U. congress, which must be prepared for in connection with the extending struggle, must be discussed in all Party organisations and in the Party press, and our Party organisations must make every effort to make this congress a real mass congress, which would represent the workers and the rank-and-file organisations of the U.G.T. (General Association of Toilers), the C.N.T. (National Confederation of Labour),* etc., as well.

It is particularly necessary to strengthen our leadership and increase our activities in the trade union unity movement. In connection with the considerable desertion from the ranks of the U.G.T., which has begun on the part of the workers, and even of whole rank-and-file organisations, and the incipient process of disintegration in the C.N.T., the trade union unity movement must become a powerful lever in our hands in the contest for the masses of workers who still follow the U.G.T. and C.N.T. leaders. In this sphere, we must concentrate our work on the districts of the strongest influence of the U.G.T. and the C.N.T., strengthening the activity of the Central Unity Commission in Catalonia, and creating a mass press which would know how to approach the C.N.T. workers, and also strengthening the united movement against the U.G.T. leaders in Estremadura, Biscay and Asturias, establishing a special organ for agricultural labourers organised in the U.G.T. Especially in Catalonia, our organisation must make use of the struggle between the fascists and Pestana and direct its efforts to strengthening, on the basis of the united front, our positions among the N.C.T. workers.

We must strengthen by all possible means, the work of the O.S.R. (Revolutionary Trade Union Opposition), which, in some places, has shown considerable achievements, and provide it with general-regional leadership.

The question of strengthening and expanding the work of the Communist fractions in the future confronts the Party as the condition for a decisive change in our whole trade union work.

New tasks and the new political conditions require that the Party should immediately reorganise its ranks and apply new organisational methods. An immediate task is the strengthening of the political leadership of the Central Committee in the provinces, not only by means of visits of responsible leading comrades, but also by means of providing for constant and systematic personal reports of representatives of the provinces to the C.C. It is also necessary that the provincial leadership should, by the same means, ensure the carrying out of the political line in the districts. This requires that responsible and politically reliable comrades should be co-opted into the leadership of the districts and provinces, on the basis of correct distribution of the Party cadres, comrades who would ensure the

* Reformist Federations.—Ed.

rrying out of the political line of the Party and e Communist International.

We must reorganise the leading organs in such way that they become more mobile and better ited to the new conditions and should be able react immediately to events. We must in ture decentralise the regional organisation and bdivide the country on a provincial basis. The partments attached to the C.C. must be ganised in such a way as to be auxiliary organs its work. A most important task is to ensure e issue of our publications, in spite of the per-cution and repressions on the part of the vernment. The central organ of the Party, e "Mundo Obrero," must be transformed into mass paper, and a theoretical organ of the arty published. The Party must devote par-cular attention to the leadership of the Y.C.L., work in which one of the leading comrades ould be appointed, and also to concentration in e most important industrial districts. It is rticularly necessary that the C.C. should help e new Communist Party of Catalonia, ensuring the regular issue of a weekly Party organ and helping in the organisation of a mass daily. After political preparation in the masses, a Communist Party of Euskari* should be established in Biscay, which, like the C.P. of Catalonia, will form part of the C.P. of Spain. The Party must send its best comrades to work among the masses of soldiers, and fight for new successes by directing to questions of the work the constant attention of all its leading organs.

All these measures and all its work the Party must carry through with the greatest persistence and enthusiasm, taking into account the fact that the growing wave of the new revolutionary upsurge and the revolution, which is approaching the decisive moment in its development, will confront the Party with the task of leading the gigantic battles of the proletarian and peasant masses—battles which will bring them ever nearer to the struggle for the overthrow of the bourgeois-landlord régime, for the establishment of a workers' and peasants' Soviet government.

* Basque name for the Basque provinces.

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